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INTRODUCTION
1

With the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), Congress
intended to provide private-sector employees with the right to
organize collectively for their mutual aid and protection in the
2
workplace. However, the NLRA faces a tsunami of criticism, much of
which highlights its inadequacies with respect to protecting collective
activity among employees. Scholars have noted that the NLRA has
fallen far short of its seventy-four-year-old goal of protecting collective
3
4
activity. In this regard, it has been referred to as “ossified” and as
5
“a failed regime.” It has been accused of not being able to “keep[]
pace with changes in the composition of the U.S. work force and the
6
structure of U.S. production systems” that accompany globalization.
In fact, “[v]arious commentators describe the [NLRA] . . . as dead,
dying, or at least ‘largely irrelevant to the contemporary workplace’—
7
a doomed legal dinosaur.”
Consequently, many labor scholars
8
contend that the NLRA “must be reinvented.”
1. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151–69 (2006)). All references to the NLRA in this Article cite to the relevant
section of 29 U.S.C.
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United
States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce . . . by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.”).
3. See, e.g., Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights:
The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 62 (2007); Benjamin I. Sachs,
Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2685–86 (2008).
4. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527, 1530 (2002) [hereinafter Estlund, Ossification].
5. Sachs, supra note 3, at 2685–86.
6. See id. at 2686 (citing KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 87–119 (2004)).
7. Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the
National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 570 (2007)
(citing James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the
Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 942 (1996)).
8. Karl Klare, The Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law,
in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND
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In light of the NLRA’s myriad limitations, some scholars have
developed promising proposals to identify new legal bases for
protecting collective activity among employees. For example, some
scholars advocate for increased state regulation of labor relations to
9
address the NLRA’s inadequate protections of collective activity.
Alternatively, Benjamin Sachs has highlighted recent efforts to look
beyond the NLRA—often referred to as “labor law”—for federal
10
protection of collective activity.
He has pointed to federal
employment law as the “legal mechanism that protects . . . collective
activity from employer interference,” thereby acting “as a substitute
11
form of labor law.” For Sachs, the NLRA’s inadequate protection of
12
collective activity has led to a “hydraulic effect,” whereby employees
and their advocates are turning to employment laws, rather than the
13
NLRA, to protect collective activity.
Sachs illustrates how the
14
anti-retaliation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
15
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act have protected collective activity
16
among employees in certain circumstances. Unlike the NLRA, these
federal employment laws provide private rights of action for
employees in federal court and relatively robust remedies for
employees who are fired or who face other types of adverse
employment actions in retaliation for making employment law
17
complaints.
Sachs persuasively makes a case that in order to
facilitate collective activity among employees, the remedies and

POSSIBILITIES 3, 4 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002). Other scholars have called for
updates to the NLRA. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the
“Company Union” Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1994); Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of
Private Sector Unionism: What Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133 (2007);
Lofaso, supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws
Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990).
10. See Sachs, supra note 3, at 2687.
11. Id. at 2688.
12. The move away from the focus on the NLRA is due, in part, to recent
limitations on the NLRA’s protection of undocumented employees. See Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 146 (2002) (limiting the remedies
available to undocumented immigrant employees who experience NLRA violations).
However, in the employment law context, undocumented immigrant employees
generally have access to a wider array of remedies. See generally Michael J. Wishnie,
Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497 (2004)
(providing a comprehensive discussion of the employment law remedies available to
undocumented immigrant employees).
13. Sachs, supra note 3, at 2687.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2003(a) (2006).
16. Sachs, supra note 3, at 2708–21.
17. Id. at 2690, 2708–31.
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private rights of action available in anti-retaliation employment law
18
cases should also be available in anti-retaliation labor law cases.
While promising, these proposals do not focus on one of the most
19
important threats to collective activity: state defamation lawsuits
filed against employees and worker organizations that have engaged
in collective activity to improve workplace conditions. Employee
speech that is sometimes fiercely critical of and offensive to
20
employers is central to collective activity among employees. In fact,
hard-hitting statements and “trash talk” are no strangers to the
rough-and-tumble arena of private-sector labor relations.
For example, in an Ohio case, an employer brought a defamation
claim after a labor union passed out handbills referring to the
employer’s general manager as a “Little Hitler” who was running
21
“a Nazi concentration camp.”
Even the United States Supreme
Court has described private-sector labor disputes as “frequently
characterized by bitter and extreme charges, countercharges,
unfounded
rumors,
vituperations,
personal
accusations,
22
misrepresentations and distortions.”
Not surprisingly, employers
sometimes bring state defamation suits against employees or worker
organizations. These employers, like all defamation plaintiffs, allege
that the employees’ statements were falsehoods that were shared with
23
a third party and resulted in harm to the employers’ reputations.

18. Id. at 2746–47.
19. For ease, this Article refers to defamation, slander, and libel as “defamation.”
See Developments in the Law—The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1612 n.9
(1999) (describing defamation and its two types—libel and slander—as
“any communication ‘that tends so to harm the reputation of another’”).
20. See John Bruce Lewis & Gregory V. Mersol, Opinion and Rhetorical Hyperbole in
Workplace Defamation Actions:
The Continuing Quest for Meaningful Standards,
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 19, 43 (2002) (“Labor disputes are hotbeds for potentially
defamatory statements.”); Teamsters’ Leaflet May Have Defamed Employer, 11 NO. 2 GA.
EMPL. L. LETTER 1, Sept. 1998 (noting that “a lot of ‘mudslinging’ goes on between
the adversaries” during union campaigns).
21. Yeager v. Local 20, Teamsters, 453 N.E.2d 666, 667 (Ohio 1983); see also Pease
v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 150, 567 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(describing how a labor union member referred to an employer in a newspaper
article as “crazy” and as “dealing with a half a deck”).
22. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966).
23. The elements necessary to prove a defamation claim vary state to state,
but scholars identify general trends among the states. See Nat Stern, Creating a New
Tort for Wrongful Misrepresentation of Character, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 81, 92 (2004).
Stern notes,
A defamatory communication is one that tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
persons from associating or dealing with him. To state a cause of action for
defamation, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s defamatory
statement pertained to the plaintiff, was false, and was published with fault to
a third person.
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While there are no empirical studies of the number of defamation
suits in the labor context, observers claim that employer defamation
lawsuits are on the rise. In fact, it is widely believed that employers
are increasingly bringing defamation lawsuits as employees and their
organizations turn to less traditional modes of collective activity
through means such as union corporate campaigns and new forms of
24
worker organizations.
This Article explores an underappreciated and promising NLRA
protection of collective activity. It elaborates the NLRA’s role as a
defense in state defamation cases. Specifically, this Article explains
how the “NLRA defamation defense” frees defendants from some
forms of defamation liability when the allegedly defamatory
statements are made during labor disputes. The defense has no
effect on defamation liability in what this Article refers to as
“more egregious” state defamation law cases. However, the defense
forecloses liability in “less egregious” state defamation law cases.
It makes it harder for defamation plaintiffs to win their cases because
25
it requires them to satisfy a heightened standard of proof. In this
way, the NLRA defamation defense limits the ability of defamation
lawsuits to serve as “a powerful weapon for shutting up those with
26
whom [one] disagree[s]” in the labor context. In other words,
it reduces the likelihood that state defamation law will chill the free
flow of speech and collective activity with the threat of monetary
27
awards, sometimes in the millions of dollars. While all parties to
Id. In the vast majority of states, truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim.
However, in extremely narrow circumstances, truth is not a complete defense in
Massachusetts. See, e.g., Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2009).
In Noonan, the court stated,
[T]he defendant may assert the statement’s truth as an absolute defense to a
libel claim . . . . Massachusetts law, however, recognizes a narrow exception
to this defense: the truth or falsity of the statement is immaterial, and the
libel action may proceed, if the plaintiff can show that the defendant acted
with ‘actual malice’ in publishing the statement.
24. See, e.g., Maurice Baskin & Herbert R. Northrup, The Impact of BE&K
Construction Co. v. NLRB on Employer Responses to Union Corporate Campaigns and
Related Tactics, 19 LAB. LAW. 215, 217 (2003) (noting that employers have developed
new litigation strategies to counter union corporate campaigns and that these
strategies include common law defamation lawsuits).
25. See id. at 218 (explaining that because of the heightened burden of proof,
“employers are required to show malice (i.e., that the union had knowledge of the
falsity of its statements) . . . [and] are also required to allege special damages, which
must be pleaded with specificity”).
26. DONALD M. GILLMOR, POWER, PUBLICITY, AND THE ABUSE OF LIBEL LAW 5 (1992)
(remarking on the role of defamation lawsuits in the media context).
27. Scholars have noted that Congress, by passing the NLRA, intended to restrict
the chilling effects large monetary awards have on collective activity. See, e.g., Eileen
Silverstein, Against Preemption In Labor Law, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1991)
(commenting that, when enacting the NLRA, “Congress eschewed other
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labor disputes who face defamation claims can take advantage of the
NLRA defamation defense, this Article focuses on the use of the
defense by employees and both traditional and non-traditional
worker organizations to highlight an important aspect of the NLRA’s
28
protection of collective activity.
This Article, thus, redirects our gaze back to federal labor law—
in particular the NLRA—as a source of protection for both
traditional and new forms of collective activity among employees.
It uncovers the NLRA’s relevancy and adaptability to new workplace
dynamics in a largely overlooked, but critical area outside of the
National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) domain: state defamation
lawsuits filed against employees and worker organizations engaged in
collective activity. It argues that the NLRA has the potential to
protect collective activity and remain relevant through its role as a
defense in state defamation lawsuits against employees and worker
organizations engaged in new forms of collective activity. In this way,
this Article joins the scholarship of Ellen Dannin and others that
shows how some aspects of the oft-criticized NLRA, even as currently
29
written, have hidden potential to protect collective activity.
Part I of this Article describes the emergence and sources of the
NLRA defamation defense within the broader context of the NLRA’s
speech policies and protections of collective activity. This Part
elaborates the Supremacy Clause underpinnings of the defense.
Part II illustrates the underappreciated aspects of the defense’s
protection of collective activity among employees. It does so with an
analysis of all trials and summary judgment motion decisions
referencing the NLRA defamation defense available through the
LEXIS legal database since the Supreme Court established the
defense forty-two years ago. Part III demonstrates the unrealized
potential of the NLRA defamation defense and elaborates how the
compensatory and punitive remedies on the ground that collective bargaining
cannot flourish in an environment of lingering acrimony and large monetary
awards”).
28. While the remainder of the Article focuses on defamation suits against
employees and worker organizations engaged in collective action, the arguments for
the breadth of the defense’s application apply equally to employers who face
defamation suits in the labor context. For an example of a case in which the court
applied the NLRA defamation defense to union-plaintiff defamation claims against
an employer, see Tosh v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 482 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1973).
For employer free speech arguments and a critique of existing restrictions on
employer speech, see generally Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Note, Free Speech and the
NLRB’s Laboratory Conditions Doctrine, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204 (2002).
29. See generally ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW: HOW TO FIGHT
THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS (2006) (developing a litigation strategy to reinvigorate
the NLRA).
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defense may apply broadly to a wide range of new collective action
strategies and new actors on the workplace-relations scene.
For instance, this Part illustrates that the defense has the potential to
reach union corporate campaigns as well as the collective activity of
emergent worker organizations, such as worker centers, which
increasingly serve as vehicles for low-wage and immigrant workers to
improve their workplaces. Finally, Part IV assesses recent proposals to
enhance state regulation of workplace relations and highlights the
unintended perils they may create for the NLRA defamation defense.
I.

THE NLRA DEFAMATION DEFENSE

Prior analyses of free speech and collective activity in the NLRA
context largely neglect what this Article will refer to as the
30
“NLRA defamation defense.” The defense, and the free speech it
promotes, has its origins in the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy
31
Clause. Because the federal law is “the supreme Law of the Land,”
the Constitution blocks certain state laws from operating when they
32
may conflict in some way with federal law. In other words, federal
law—in this instance, the NLRA—“preempts” conflicting state laws in
33
some circumstances.
With its roots in Supreme Court
interpretations of the Supremacy Clause, the NLRA defamation

30. This is due, in part, to the fact that much free speech and collective activity
analysis focuses largely on NLRB proceedings and the First Amendment, rather than
on lawsuits outside of the NLRB. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want?
Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (1992) [hereinafter, Estlund, Employee Interests];
Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First Amendment,
16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356 (1995); Kate E. Andrias, Note, A Robust Public
Debate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace Representation Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415
(2003); Kate L. Rakoczy, Comment, On Mock Funerals, Banners, and Giant Rat Balloons:
Why Current Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act
Unconstitutionally Burdens Union Speech, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1621 (2007).
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
32. See id. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
33. See David L. Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or
Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 508 (1986) (“[T]he labor preemption
doctrine . . . applies the federal preemption principles of the supremacy clause to
labor relations issues.”); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408,
2412 (2008) (describing the NLRA’s dual preemption doctrines and stating that
“Garmon pre-emption . . . is intended to preclude state interference with the
[NLRB’s] interpretation and active enforcement of the integrated scheme of
regulation established by the NLRA,” and that “Machinists pre-emption[] forbids
both the [NLRB] and States to regulate conduct that Congress intended [to] be
unregulated” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976))).
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34

defense is a judicially-created doctrine.
One will not find the
defense by reading through the NLRA itself. In fact, the text of the
NLRA is entirely silent with respect to its preemptive effect on
35
potentially overlapping state laws, including defamation laws.
As one labor law scholar has noted, “Congress provided the tune, and
36
left the lyrics partly to judicial improvisation.”
There is an evident conflict between federal labor law, here
embodied in the NLRA, and state defamation law. On the one hand,
it is widely acknowledged that the NLRA promotes statutory
free-speech policies that may go beyond what the First Amendment
37
38
requires.
In Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, the Supreme Court
recently acknowledged that it has “characterized this policy
judgment, which suffuses the NLRA as a whole, as ‘favoring
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate in labor disputes,’
stressing that ‘freewheeling use of the written and spoken
39
word . . . has been expressly fostered by Congress . . . .’”
The
Supreme Court and scholars have repeatedly acknowledged that
speech is important to employees’ NLRA section 7 right to “engage in
concerted activities to persuade other employees to join for their
40
mutual aid and protection,” and to their NLRA section 9 right to
share “information and opinions” before a NLRB-supervised election
to determine whether a labor organization will serve as their

34. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239–40 (1959)
(stating that the NLRA “inevitably gave rise to difficult problems of federal-state
relations” in part because it was “drawn with broad strokes” and therefore “the details
had to be filled in, to no small extent, by the judicial process”).
35. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006); see also Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966) (“Our task is rendered more difficult by the failure
of the Congress to furnish precise guidance in either the language of the [NLRA] or
its legislative history.”); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953)
(“The [NLRA] . . . leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from
telling us how much.”).
36. Thomas S. Currier, Defamation in Labor Disputes: Preemption and the New Federal
Common Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 1, 29 (1967).
37. While I focus here on statutory free speech rights, the NLRA’s free speech
policies undoubtedly analogize to the First Amendment. See Frederick Schauer,
The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1782 (2004) (stating that while “free speech ideas have been
incorporated into some dimensions of statutory labor law, most of labor law proceeds
unimpeded by the First Amendment”).
38. 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
39. Id. at 2414 (quoting Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
272–73 (1974)).
40. Austin, 418 U.S. at 277 (quoting NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 279
(1960)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 157; Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the
Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 737 (1997)
(noting that NLRA section 7 protects “some rough and abusive language . . . as part
of the inevitable high emotions that accompany labor disputes”).
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41

collective bargaining representative. In 1947, when Congress passed
42
the Labor Management Relations Act, amending the NLRA,
it added a specific provision protecting certain aspects of speech from
43
government restraint. While the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments are
44
often viewed as pro-employer amendments, they also provide a
little-noticed protection of employee and labor union speech.
NLRA section 8(c) clarifies that “views, argument, or opinion” cannot
be the basis of a NLRA unfair labor practice “if such expression
45
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” As the
Supreme Court recently stated in Brown, NLRA section 8(c) “protects
speech by both unions and employers from regulation by the
46
NLRB.”
On the other hand, states have a longstanding and broad interest
in protecting the reputations of their citizens from defamatory
47
speech regardless of the context.
Defamatory speech, thus, is a
traditional area of local, rather than federal, concern. In 1966,
the Supreme Court acknowledged this federal-state tension, stating
that, because “[l]abor disputes are ordinarily heated affairs[,]
the language that is commonplace there might well be deemed
48
actionable” as defamatory in some state courts.
Before 1966, the majority of lower courts resolved this federal-state
49
tension through total preemption of state defamation law. In other
words, courts largely interpreted the NLRA to require complete
protection of labor speech from liability under state defamation law.
The Supreme Court’s 1959 decision in San Diego Building Trades

41. See Austin, 418 U.S. at 277 n.12; see also 29 U.S.C. § 159.
42. Pub, L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-44, 167, 171-87).
43. In the comments to § 158 of the U.S. Code, Congress provided that the
“Act June 23, 1947, amended section . . . by inserting provisions protecting the right
of free speech for both employers and unions.” See 29 U.S.C. § 158.
44. James A. Gross, Worker Rights as Human Rights: Wagner Act Values and Moral
Choices, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 479, 482–84 (2002).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
46. Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2413; see also DANNIN, supra note 29, at 109–10 (providing
a persuasive argument that section 8(c) has the potential to protect union speech).
47. States, as part of their police powers, have the constitutional authority to
regulate some aspects of speech that injure the reputations of their citizens.
See Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 302–03
(1977); see also Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 742 (1983).
48. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966).
49. Currier, supra note 36, at 2 n.7 (“A majority of the courts faced with the
problem prior to Linn took this position.” (citing cases)); see, e.g., Sullivan v. Day
Publ’g Co., 239 F. Supp. 677 (D. Conn. 1965); Oss v. Birmingham, 399 P.2d 655
(Ariz. 1965); Chaffeurs Local 150 v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. App. 2d 452 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964).
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50

Council v. Garmon served as a guide for many courts grappling with
NLRA preemption in the defamation context. Garmon did not
specifically address NLRA preemption of state defamation suits but
set out a framework to determine when the NLRA preempts state
51
law.
In discussing Garmon preemption, the Supreme Court has
explained that the NLRA requires that “state courts . . . defer to the
exclusive competence of the [NLRB] in cases in which the activity
that is the subject matter of the litigation is arguably subject to the
protections . . . or prohibitions . . . of the [NLRA’s unfair labor
52
practice provisions].”
On the other hand, if the activity to be
regulated by the state does not arguably fall within the NLRB’s ambit,
it is “a merely peripheral concern” of the NLRA and is not
53
preempted. The lower courts largely applied Garmon to find that
state defamation law trenched upon the NLRB’s authority to regulate
54
speech in the labor context.
In its 1966 decision in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local
55
114, the Supreme Court disagreed with the majority of lower courts
and established a new type of NLRA preemption: the NLRA
56
defamation defense.
A bare majority of Supreme Court justices
struck a middle ground between requiring total preemption of
57
defamation suits and allowing states free reign in this area.
Linn involved an allegedly defamatory leaflet that was circulated
during a union organizing effort at Pinkerton’s Detective Agency in
58
Detroit, Michigan. The leaflet said:
United Plant Guard Workers now has evidence
A. That Pinkerton has 10 jobs in Saginaw, Michigan.
B. Employing 52 men.
C. Some of these jobs are 10 yrs. old!
(8) Make you feel kind sick & foolish.
(9) The men in Saginaw were deprived of their right to vote in three
N.L.R.B. elections. Their names were not summitted [sic]. These
50. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
51. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 381 (1986) (“[Garmon]
set forth a general standard for determining when state proceedings or regulations
are preempted by the [NLRA].”).
52. Linn, 383 U.S. at 60 (quoting Local 100 of United Ass’n of Journeymen and
Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693–94 (1963)).
53. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243.
54. See Currier, supra note 36, at 2 n.7.
55. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
56. See id. at 64–65 (ruling that “state remedies for libel” would be permitted only
when “the complainant can show that the defamatory statements were circulated
with malice and caused him damage”).
57. See Linn, 383 U.S. 53 (5-4 decision).
58. Id. at 55–56.
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guards were voted into the Union in 1959! These Pinkerton guards
were robbed of pay increases. The Pinkerton manegers [sic] were
lying to us—all the time the contract was in effect. No doubt the
59
Saginaw men will file criminal charges. Somebody may go to Jail!

Linn, one of the managers, sued several employees and the union
60
for one million dollars in damages pursuant to state defamation law.
The defendants argued that the NLRA preempted the state
61
defamation suit entirely.
After considering Garmon’s preemption doctrine, the Linn Court
concluded that total preemption was not merited because states have
a strong interest in regulating more egregious forms of defamation
62
against their citizens and this type of state regulation had
63
“no relevance to the [NLRB]’s function.” In other words, the Court
concluded that states did not always have to defer to the exclusive
competence of the NLRB because state defamation law addresses a
harm (reputational damage) that is separate from the harms
64
addressed by the NLRB (unfair labor practices). After determining
that the NLRB’s role would not be injured, however, the Linn Court
went on to conclude that the NLRA (and therefore the Supremacy
Clause) required some circumscription of state defamation law in the
65
labor context. The Court reasoned that state regulation of allegedly
defamatory statements during labor disputes must be limited in order
to avoid “dampen[ing] the ardor of labor debate and truncate[ing]
66
the free discussion envisioned by the [NLRA].”
The Court also
sought to decrease the likelihood that defamation suits, which
sometimes lead to “excessive damages,” would be “used as weapons of
67
economic coercion.”

59. Id. at 56 (alterations in original).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 60–61.
63. Id. at 63.
64. See id. (reasoning further that “[t]he malicious publication of libelous
statements does not in and of itself constitute an unfair labor practice” because the
statements may not be sufficiently “coercive or misleading” to constitute a NLRA
unfair labor practice); see also Gottesman, supra note 9, at 382 (noting that
defamation preemption cases are not treated with standard Garmon analysis in part
because “the state is enforcing a general law that happens to be applicable in a labor
dispute, not a law focused specifically on labor relations”).
65. Linn, 383 U.S. at 64.
66. Id.; see also Healthcare Ass’n v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“Linn held that state defamation laws would be preempted by federal labor law if
the defamation laws did not require malice and injury; otherwise, the defamation
laws might allow ‘unwarranted intrusion upon free discussion envisioned by the
[NLRA].’” (quoting Linn, 383 U.S. at 65)).
67. Linn, 383 U.S. at 64.
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In resolving the tension between the state’s interest in protecting
its citizens from “defamatory attacks” and the NLRA’s promotion of
68
speech, the Linn Court concluded that the NLRA requires a
69
limitation on state defamation law in the labor context.
Citing
NLRA section 8(c) as well as the NLRA’s general promotion of free
speech, the Court reasoned that requiring a heightened standard of
proof—in other words, preempting some less egregious state
defamation cases—struck a delicate balance between state
70
The Linn Court borrowed the
defamation law and the NLRA.
71
heightened New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard of proof for
72
allegedly defamatory statements made about public officials and
73
applied it to the NLRA arena. The Court in New York Times had
concluded that, because the allegedly defamatory statements were
made about public officials, the First Amendment required a
74
heightened standard of proof. The Linn Court was careful to point
out that, by referencing the New York Times heightened standard of
proof, it imported First Amendment principles into the NLRA
75
context “by analogy, rather than under constitutional compulsion.”
Thus, the NLRA defamation defense was required, not because of the
First Amendment, but rather to accord with the NLRA’s free speech
policies and therefore the Supremacy Clause.
Linn’s heightened standard of proof for NLRA labor dispute cases
requires a defamation plaintiff to show that a defendant’s statements
76
were “a deliberate or reckless untruth,” and that the statements
77
caused actual harm. In contrast, state defamation law outside of the
labor dispute context often only requires the plaintiff to show that
the defendant was negligent in making his or her untruthful
statements to a third party and does not require demonstrable proof

68. Id. at 57–58.
69. See id. at 64–65.
70. Id. at 62–65.
71. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
72. Id. at 267. Three years after the Supreme Court decided N.Y. Times,
it extended the protection to statements made about public figures. See Curtis Publ’g
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
73. See Linn, 383 U.S. at 65.
74. See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (noting that the First Amendment requires
“a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”).
75. Linn, 383 U.S. at 65.
76. Id. at 63.
77. Id. at 64–65.
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78

that the statements led to actual harm. As the Linn Court declared,
during labor disputes, “the most repulsive speech enjoys immunity
[from defamation liability] provided it falls short of a deliberate or
79
reckless untruth.” Moreover, according to Linn, even deliberate or
reckless untruths are not actionable state defamation claims unless
the defamation plaintiff can also prove that these untruths led to
80
actual damages.
By establishing this heightened standard and therefore only
allowing state defamation law liability in more egregious cases, Linn’s
NLRA defamation defense illustrates a type of statutory “prohibition
81
against punishment or suppression of speech” in the labor context.
The defense protects allegedly defamatory statements from liability
under state defamation law by requiring that courts adjudicate state
82
defamation claims pursuant to the heightened standard of proof.
In 1974, the Supreme Court further spelled out the NLRA
83
defamation defense in Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin and
elaborated upon it through what many courts and commentators
refer to as the opinion or hyperbole defense to defamation lawsuits in
84
the labor context. Austin involved an ongoing union organizing
85
effort among postal employees. After the postal employees selected
the union as their collective bargaining representative, the union
continued its efforts to organize the remaining postal employees that
had not joined the union. In a newsletter, the union published the
names of these remaining employees under the heading, “List of
78. Several cases demonstrate the difficulty in meeting the heightened standard.
See, e.g., Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Reinke Insulation Co., 464 F.3d
651 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding a summary judgment dismissal of complainant
company’s claim that the union distributed a defamatory handbill); Davis Co. v.
United Furniture Workers, 674 F.2d 557, 563 (6th Cir. 1982) (reversing a lower court’s
decision in favor of the complainant company because the company could not show
that the special bulletin distributed by the union was published with actual malice
and knowledge of its falsity).
79. Linn, 383 U.S. at 63.
80. Id. at 63–65.
81. Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101,
114 (1995) [hereinafter Estlund, Free Speech].
82. Regardless of the outcome of a state defamation claim, however, the NLRB
may conclude that speech is protected or prohibited pursuant to the NLRA. See Linn,
383 U.S. at 71.
83. 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (applying Linn to Executive Order No. 11491 and stating
that “the same federal policies favoring uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate in
labor disputes are applicable here, and . . . the same accommodation of conflicting
federal and state interests necessarily follows”).
84. See, e.g., Lewis & Mersol, supra note 20, at 45–46 (“Many courts, following the
reasoning of [Austin], protected statements made in the context of labor disputes
under the ‘hyperbole, rhetoric, epithet’ rationale . . . protecting hyperbole and
opinion in labor disputes.”).
85. 418 U.S. at 266.
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86

Scabs.” The newsletter also included the following definition of a
scab from “a well-known piece of trade union literature, generally
87
attributed to author Jack London.” The definition stated:
‘The Scab
‘After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire,
He had some awful substance left with which He made a scab.
‘A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain,
a combination backbone of jelly and glue. Where others have
hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten principles.
‘When a scab comes down the street, men turn their backs and
Angels weep in Heaven, and the Devil shuts the gates of hell to
keep him out.
‘No man (or woman) has a right to scab so long as there is a pool
of water to drown his carcass in, or a rope long enough to hang his
body with. Judas was a gentleman compared with a scab.
For betraying his Master, he had character enough to hang himself.
A scab has not.
‘Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage. Judas sold his Savior
for thirty pieces of silver. Benedict Arnold sold his country for a
promise of a commission in the British Army. The scab sells his
birthright, country, his wife, his children and his fellowmen for an
unfulfilled promise from his employer.
‘Esau was a traitor to himself; Judas was a traitor to his God; Benedict
Arnold was a traitor to his country; a SCAB is a traitor to his God,
88
his country, his family and his class.’

One of the employees in the “List of Scabs” sued the union
89
In approaching this issue,
pursuant to state defamation law.
the Austin Court reaffirmed Linn’s requirement that the defamation
plaintiff prove that the defendant recklessly, or knowingly, published
90
an untruth and that the untruth led to demonstrable harm.
The Court also clarified that, in the labor context, statements that
cannot be “construed as representations of fact,” including
“rhetorical hyperbole,” cannot be the basis of state defamation law
91
liability. The Court stated:
“[T]o use loose language or undefined slogans that are part of the
conventional give-and-take in our economic and political
controversies—like ‘unfair’ or ‘fascist’—is not to falsify facts.”
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 267.
Id. at 268.
Id.
Id. at 268–69.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 284, 286.
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Such words were obviously used here in a loose, figurative sense to
demonstrate the union’s strong disagreement with the views of
those workers who oppose unionization. Expression of such an
opinion, even in the most pejorative terms, is protected under
92
federal labor law.

Applying the standard, the Court determined that the union could
not be liable under state defamation law for the “List of Scabs” and its
93
accompanying definition.
Since Linn and Austin, the Supreme Court has not directly
confronted any issues related to the NLRA defamation defense in any
other case, but has frequently referenced it in other NLRA
94
preemption cases outside of the defamation law context.
II. THE NLRA DEFAMATION DEFENSE AND THE PROTECTION OF
COLLECTIVE ACTIVITY
The NLRA defamation defense is an important protection of
collective activity because it reduces the likelihood that state
defamation lawsuits will chill the speech that is so critical to collective
activity. As labor scholar Thomas Currier argued in the late 1960s,
the defense reduces the threat that employers will win state
defamation law judgments against labor unions or employees
95
engaged in collective activity.
He noted that without the NLRA
defamation defense, “the potential size of defamation verdicts and
the possibility of frequent resort to state defamation remedies might
96
otherwise truncate free discussion in labor disputes . . . .” According
to Currier, while the NLRA defamation defense does not remove the
threat of state defamation law entirely, it “reduce[s] the latitude” that
courts have and “eliminate[s] at least some of the grosser anomalies
97
that characterize the common law of defamation.” This is important
because, as other labor scholars noted soon after the Supreme Court
established the NLRA defamation defense in 1966, “[f]reedom of
expression and healthy debate are equally indispensable and may be
throttled by threats of libel and slander suits should they become
98
weapons in industrial conflict.”
92. Id. at 284 (quoting Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos,
320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943)).
93. Id. at 286.
94. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2413–14 (2008);
Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 742 (1983).
95. Currier, supra note 36, at 29.
96. Id. at 6.
97. Id. at 2.
98. Committee on Labor Law of the Federal Bar Council, Concerning Problems of
Defamation and Freedom of Expression in Labor Relations, 23 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
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Intercity Maintenance Co. v. Local 254 Service Employees International
99
Union demonstrates the challenge of meeting the heightened
100
standard of proof required by the NLRA defamation defense.
Intercity involved allegedly defamatory statements that a union made
101
during an organizing campaign among janitors in Rhode Island.
In an effort to pressure the janitorial employer, the union sent a
102
letter to a hospital that utilized the janitorial employer’s services.
Among other things, the letter stated that the janitorial employer
“expose[d] its cleaners to chemical and biological hazards including
103
HIV and Hepatitis B virus.” According to the court, the union had
acted recklessly and had “made scant effort to investigate the veracity
104
However,
of these charges” before including them in the letter.
even though the defamation plaintiff “succeeded in proving that the
defendants . . . [were] lawless, marauding, disingenuous, character
assassins who deserve[d] their comeuppance,” the defamation claim
was not sent to the jury because the plaintiff did not “allege and
105
prove specific or special damages” resulting from the statements.
Because there was a labor dispute, the NLRA preempted the
less-exacting, more plaintiff-friendly state law standard that would
106
have presumed damages without any proof.
Instead, the plaintiffs
had to meet the NLRA defamation defense’s heightened standard by
alleging and proving that the defendant intentionally lied, or acted
107
recklessly, and that the statements led to actual harm.
Empirical studies of news media defamation cases confirm that the
heightened standard of proof makes it considerably more difficult for
a defamation plaintiff to win his or her case. When such cases are
brought by public officials or public figures, the same heightened
New York Times standard of proof applies as in NLRA defamation
108
defense cases.
In an early study still considered definitive with
REV. 101, 101 (1969); see also Lewis & Mersol, supra note 20, at 20 (discussing the
effect of defamation lawsuits on collective activity in a more contemporary context).
99. 241 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2001).
100. See id. at 90 (“[P]laintiffs who endure even malicious libels during a labor
dispute must present evidence of harm from defamation in order to recover,
notwithstanding the law of states such as Rhode Island in which damages would
otherwise be presumed.”).
101. Id. at 85–86.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 89.
104. Id.
105. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 89–90.
108. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283–84 (1964) (setting out a
heightened standard of proof in defamation claims brought by public officials);
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966) (applying the
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respect to this issue, scholars compared defamation cases in which
courts required the heightened standard of proof (i.e., those brought
by public officials or figures) with defamation cases in which courts
did not require the heightened standard of proof (i.e., those brought
109
by private citizens).
This media study found that a defamation
plaintiff was sixty percent less likely to win when the heightened
110
standard of proof was required. More recent studies are consistent
with this finding. For example, a national study of summary
judgment motions to dismiss defamation cases brought by public
figures or public officials showed that courts, applying the
heightened standard of proof, dismissed the claims eighty-five
111
percent of the time between 1980 and 1996. However, in that same
period, courts dismissed private plaintiff defamation claims through
112
summary judgment motions only sixty-eight percent of the time.
This Author’s LEXIS legal database research and coding of all
federal and state cases that cite Linn (from the date of the Linn
decision in 1966 through February 22, 2009) further indicates that
defendants are highly successful in dismissing defamation claims
when the court applies the NLRA defamation defense. While it is
important to acknowledge that the vast majority of defamation cases
113
never make it to the LEXIS database, some motions and trials
related to the NLRA defamation defense do make it to the database
and may provide at least some insight into the usefulness of the
defense. Defamation defendants were successful in winning twelve
out of nineteen trials that required application of the NLRA

N.Y. Times heightened standard of proof to defamation claims brought in the labor
context); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 146–55 (1967) (applying the N.Y.
Times heightened standard of proof to defamation claims brought by public figures).
109. RANDALL P. BEZANSON, GILBERT CRANBERG & JOHN SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE
PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 122 (Free Press, 1987).
110. Id.
111. David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Libel
Litigation, 87 VA. L. REV. 503, 510 (2001) (citing Press Release, Media Law Resource
Center, New LDRC Study Shows Highest Incidence of Summary Judgment Grants to
Defendants in Media Defamation Cases (Aug. 1997), http://www.medialaw.org/
Template.cfm?Section=News&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentID=717).
112. Id. Similarly, between 1983 and 2004, media defendants won 71.4 percent
of all motions to dismiss defamation cases that public plaintiffs brought against
them. Press Release, Media Law Resource Center, Motions to Dismiss May
be Winning Strategy for Media in Libel and Privacy Lawsuits (Oct. 2004),
http://www.medialaw.org/Content/NavigationMenu/About_MLRC/News/2004_Bu
lletin_No_3B.htm. In contrast, they won only 51.9 percent of all motions to dismiss
defamation cases that private plaintiffs brought against them. Id.
113. For relevant limitations on the use of LEXIS/Westlaw searches in empirical
studies, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste
and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1558–61 (2008).
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114

defamation defense.
Moreover, in six out of six trials where the
court explicitly rejected the NLRA defamation defense, the
115
Furthermore, defamation defendants
defamation defendants lost.
were granted summary judgment dismissals before trial in forty-four
116
out of fifty-six attempts. This is particularly notable because courts
are reluctant to grant summary judgment dismissals of defamation
117
claims early in litigation, as such cases are highly fact dependent.
While the NLRA defamation defense provides important
protection of collective activity among employees, this Article does
not argue that the defense provides comprehensive protection of
worker organization and employee speech during collective activity.
For instance, the defense does not stop employers, employees,
or unions from filing lawsuits in response to allegedly defamatory

114. To find relevant cases, my research assistant and I searched “Federal & State
Cases, Combined” on the LEXIS legal database for a citation to Linn. We used Linn’s
numerical citation—“383 U.S. 53”—as our search term. The search yielded 698 cases
that cited Linn. After reviewing these cases, I then identified a much smaller group
of nineteen cases in which the court applied the NLRA defamation defense to a trial.
I coded each trial based on the highest court opinion related to the trial. Thus, if a
trial outcome was appealed to a higher court, I coded it based on the outcome of the
trial on appeal.
115. The coding yielded six trials involving an explicit consideration and rejection
of the application of the NLRA defamation defense to a defamation suit involving
the workplace. Hughes v. N. Cal. Carpenters Reg’l Council, No. A112272, 2007 WL
1448746 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2007); Hotel and Rest. Employees Union v. Zurzolo,
233 N.E.2d 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968); J & J Constr. Co. v. Bricklayers & Allied
Craftsmen, Local 1, 631 N.W.2d 42 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 664 N.W.2d 728
(Mich. 2003); Lundgren v. Pawtucket Firefighters Ass’n Local 1261, 595 A.2d 808
(R.I. 1991); Caruso v. Local 690, 730 P.2d 1299 (Wash. 1987); Oetzman v. Ahrens,
427 N.W.2d 421 (Wis. Ct. App 1988).
116. The coding yielded fifty-six summary judgment motion outcomes that
applied the NLRA defamation defense. Similar to the trials, each summary
judgment motion was coded based on the highest court opinion on that issue.
Thus, if a summary judgment motion was appealed, the motion was coded based on
the outcome of the motion on appeal. If the summary judgment motion was not
appealed but the case later went to trial, the outcome of the summary judgment
motion was separately coded, as well as the outcome of the trial. A few summary
judgment motions contained mixed results whereby the plaintiff won summary
judgment with respect to some of the allegedly defamatory statements and the
defendant won summary judgment with respect to other allegedly defamatory
statements. In those situations, the summary judgment outcome in favor of the
plaintiff was coded, and a summary judgment outcome in favor of the defendant was
separately coded. Because nomenclature varies from state to state, a motion to
dismiss was coded as a summary judgment motion to dismiss if it was based on
something more than solely the complaint. In other words, motions to dismiss based
on the plaintiff’s failure to properly plead actual malice in the complaint were not
counted as summary judgment motions to dismiss.
117. While the LEXIS data cannot speak to whether these defamation defendants
were more successful than other defamation defendants where the standard was not
applied, my data confirms that defamation defendants are highly successful when the
defense applies.
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statements, thereby imposing litigation costs upon all parties.
The NLRA defamation defense also does not protect employees from
termination or other adverse employment actions resulting from
their allegedly defamatory statements. An employee could only find
relief for these adverse employment actions through NLRA unfair
119
labor practice charges at the NLRB or, in some states, through
120
common law causes of action. Nonetheless, the NLRA defamation
defense has historically protected collective activity by reducing the
likelihood that the threat of state defamation trial awards will hamper
speech during collective activity. As this Article elaborates next,
the defense also has the potential to apply to new forms of collective
activity among employees.
III. THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF THE
NLRA DEFAMATION DEFENSE
The NLRA defamation defense has the potential to remain
relevant in the face of modern workplace relations and new
worker-organizing strategies because it can apply in a wide array of
circumstances. Linn, Austin, and other Supreme Court cases that cite
the NLRA defamation defense direct courts to apply a heightened
121
standard of proof to statements made during labor disputes.
The NLRA defines “labor dispute” expansively to include
“any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of
employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether
118. For a discussion of defamation litigation costs in the media context,
see LARRY SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY 70 (1991). For a discussion of defamation
litigation costs in the labor context, see Paul More, Protections Against Retaliatory
Employer Lawsuits After BE&K Construction v. NLRB, 25 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L.
205, 222 (2004).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2006).
120. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of
Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 332 (2005) (referring to the “dynamic body
of wrongful discharge law” in the employment arena).
121. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 270–71 (1974)
(referring to the NLRA defamation defense as applicable to allegedly defamatory
statements “published during labor disputes,” “occurring during labor disputes,”
and “made in the course of labor disputes”); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969) (describing the defense as applicable to allegedly defamatory statements
“used in labor disputes”); see also Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741–42
(1983) (stating that “an employer has the right to seek local judicial protection from
tortious conduct during a labor dispute”); Local 926, Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 681 n.11 (1983) (citing the defense and referring to
“a malicious and injurious libel in the course of a labor dispute”); Farmer v. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 300 (1977) (referring to the
defense as applicable to “conduct occurring in the course of a labor dispute”).
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the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
122
employee.” Similar to the Supreme Court, the United States Courts
of Appeals that cite the NLRA defamation defense refer to the
standard as broadly applicable to allegedly defamatory statements
made “in the context of,” “during,” or “in the course of” a labor
123
dispute.
Additionally, the NLRA defamation defense can apply to
defamation suits that spring from labor disputes: (A) even when the
NLRB would not protect or would prohibit the allegedly defamatory
statements in a separate unfair labor practices proceeding; (B) even
when the defamation plaintiff and defamation defendant do not have
an employer-employee relationship; and (C) even when the allegedly
defamatory statements are not made by or about a NLRA labor
organization or its members. Thus, the NLRA defamation defense is
an aspect of the NLRA that can adapt to changing circumstances and
can remain a relevant source of protection for collective activity.
A. Applies Even When the NLRB Would Prohibit or Would Not Protect
Allegedly Defamatory Speech
The NLRA defamation defense applies in defamation suits that
arise during labor disputes even when the NLRB, through an unfair
labor practice proceeding, would not protect employees from adverse
employment actions that flow from the statements, or when the
NLRB would prohibit the behavior. Employees may seek protection
from certain unfair labor practices by filing charges against their
124
employers with the NLRB pursuant to section 8(a) of the NLRA.
NLRA section 8(a)(1) declares that it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer to coerce or interfere with an employee’s right to
125
engage in NLRA-protected concerted activity.
Similarly, NLRA
122. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9).
123. See, e.g., Steam Press Holdings, Inc. v. Haw. Teamsters, Local 996, 302 F.3d
998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2002) (referring to “statements . . . made in the context of a labor
dispute”); Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 241 F.3d 82,
90 (1st Cir. 2001) (referring to statements made “during a labor dispute”); Dunn v.
Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 193 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 1999) (referring to statements
“published in the context of a labor dispute”); Fry v. Airline Pilots Ass’n, 88 F.3d 831,
844 (10th Cir. 1996) (referring to “written materials disseminated in the course of a
labor dispute”); Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food Commercial Workers
Union, Local 655, 39 F.3d 191, 194 (8th Cir. 1994) (referring to statements that
“occurred within the context of a ‘labor dispute’”).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3).
125. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”);
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to
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section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate against employees for engaging in NLRA-protected
126
concerted activity.
Although these NLRA 8(a) provisions provide certain protections,
they do not protect every statement made by worker organizations or
employees engaged in collective activity. For example, the Supreme
127
Court’s 1953 Jefferson Standard decision established that NLRA
section 8(a) does not protect employees engaged in collective activity
from adverse employment actions that flow from disloyal statements
128
that are not sufficiently linked to the underlying labor dispute.
Nonetheless, as this Article elaborates upon below, statements may
fall under the protection of the NLRA’s defamation defense in a state
defamation law action even when NLRA section 8(a) does not protect
employees from the consequences of these same statements in a
NLRB proceeding.
Separately, NLRA section 8(b) provisions prohibit labor
organizations from engaging in certain activity. Among other things,
NLRA section 8(b) provisions make it an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to restrain or coerce employees and restrict labor
organizations from some forms of pressure on employers that are
129
neutral or secondary to the primary dispute.
The NLRA section
8(b) unfair labor practice provisions may prohibit labor organizations
from making certain statements. However, labor organizations may
be shielded from defamation liability in a state proceeding for these
same statements if the plaintiff cannot meet the NLRA defamation
defense’s heightened standard of proof.
The broad reach of the NLRA defamation defense to allegedly
defamatory statements that the NLRA’s unfair labor practice
provisions would not protect, or would prohibit, has its roots in the
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [the employees’
NLRA section 7 rights].”).
126. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . [to discriminate] in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization.”).
127. NLRB v. Local 1229, Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard),
346 U.S. 464 (1953).
128. See id. at 475–81. In that case, employees made public statements about the
poor quality of their employer’s television broadcasting after collective bargaining
talks broke down. Id. at 467–68. The employer fired the employees because they
made these statements and the employees filed NLRA section 8(a) unfair labor
practice charges. Id. at 469. The Supreme Court determined that the employer’s
termination of the employees did not violate NLRA section 8(a) because the
employees were disloyal and the content of the statements was not sufficiently linked
to the ongoing labor dispute. Id. at 475, 477.
129. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b).
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preemption doctrine. Linn extended the NLRA’s preemptive reach
in the defamation context beyond activities that the NLRB directly
regulates pursuant to the unfair labor practice provisions of NLRA
130
sections 8(a) and 8(b). Prior to Linn, the Garmon decision required
NLRA-preemption of state regulation when the activities were
131
“arguably protected or prohibited by” the NLRA’s unfair labor
practice provisions. It did so in order to protect the NLRB’s
132
exclusive role in adjudicating unfair labor practice charges.
After considering Garmon’s preemption doctrine, the Linn Court
concluded that state regulation of allegedly defamatory statements
made during labor disputes had nothing to do with the NLRB’s
function; therefore, it was unnecessary to make an inquiry into
whether the activity would be “arguably protected or prohibited by”
133
the NLRA’s unfair labor practice provisions.
Instead, the Court
declared that the relevant inquiry for courts deciding whether to
apply the NLRA defamation defense is whether the allegedly defamatory
134
statements were made during a labor dispute. In arriving at its holding,
the Linn Court explicitly rejected a narrow analytical focus on
whether NLRA sections 8(a) or 8(b) would arguably protect or
135
prohibit the allegedly defamatory statements. The lower court had
determined that the state defamation claim was NLRA-preempted
because, given the content of the statements, they “would arguably
constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)” of the
136
NLRA.
However, the Linn Court disagreed with the lower court’s
analysis and redefined the preemption inquiry more broadly as
137
whether the statements were made “during a labor dispute.”

130. See Norton J. Come, Federal Preemption Since Garmon, 17 LAB. L.J. 195, 199–201
(1966) (discussing Linn’s adaptation of Garmon).
131. The Supreme Court has referred to Garmon’s “arguably protected or
prohibited by” NLRA preemption standard in a number of cases. See, e.g., Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 110 (1989) (citing Garmon
and stating that “state jurisdiction over conduct arguably protected or prohibited by
the NLRA is pre-empted in the interest of maintaining uniformity in the
administration of the federal regulatory jurisdiction”); Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v.
Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 394 (1986) (“As the Garmon line of cases directs, the pre-emption
inquiry is whether the conduct at issue was arguably protected or prohibited by the
NLRA.”).
132. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959)
(requiring that state courts “defer to the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the
danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted”).
133. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63–64 (1966).
134. See id. at 55.
135. Id. at 63.
136. Id. at 55.
137. Id. at 63–65; see also Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 742
(explaining that the Linn Court held that “an employer can properly recover
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Moreover, although the Linn and Austin Courts were undoubtedly
aware of the Jefferson Standard decision, they did not limit the reach of
the NLRA defamation defense to NLRA section 8(a)-protected
statements that are loyal and sufficiently linked to a labor dispute.
As mentioned above, the Court explicitly wanted to divorce the
Garmon “arguably protected or prohibited by” inquiry from the NLRA
defamation defense inquiry. Similarly, when setting out the NLRA
defamation defense, the Supreme Court did not say that the defense
applied only if the NLRA section 8(b) provisions would not prohibit
those statements. When the Supreme Court decided Linn in 1966,
and Austin in 1974, it was undoubtedly aware of its 1947 amendments
to the NLRA, which added section 8(b) and its explicit prohibitions
of some labor organization activity.
Another preemption doctrine developed in the NLRA context,
138
commonly referred to as the “Machinists preemption doctrine,”
similarly illustrates the NLRA’s broad preemptive reach over activities
that are not directly regulated through the NLRA’s unfair labor
practice provisions.
The Machinists preemption doctrine
acknowledges that the NLRA established “a zone free from all
139
regulations, whether state or federal.”
In other words, the NLRA
preempts some state laws even if the NLRA takes only a laissez-faire
approach to the state-regulated activity and fails to directly regulate it
through explicit unfair labor practice protections or prohibitions.
Thus, Linn and Austin preemption of less egregious state defamation
claims (the NLRA defamation defense) falls in between the Garmon
and Machinists preemption doctrines because it applies to allegedly
defamatory statements (1) that the NLRB would separately protect or
prohibit through the NLRA’s unfair labor practice provisions, and
(2) that the NLRB would not separately protect or prohibit, as long as
the statements were made during a NLRA labor dispute.
The Supreme Court has recently confirmed that the NLRA
preempts state law even when such law does not touch upon an area
that is “arguably protected or prohibited by” the NLRA’s section 8(a)
and 8(b) unfair labor practice provisions. In Chamber of Commerce v.

damages in a tort action arising out of a labor dispute if it can prove malice and actual
injury”) (emphasis added)).
138. See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
139. Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (2008) (quoting
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I.,
507 U.S. 218, 226 (1993); see also Machinists, 427 U.S. at 144 (stating that the NLRA
intends some activity “to be controlled by the free play of economic forces” (quoting
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971))).
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140

Brown, the Supreme Court considered both the NLRA’s Machinists
141
The Court
preemption doctrine and the NLRA’s speech policies.
determined that the NLRA preempted a California state law because
it would have excessively limited employers’ free speech with respect
142
to “assist[ing], promot[ing], or deter[ring] union organizing.”
The state law at issue in the case limited the kinds of statements
employers could make about unionization but did not necessarily
trench upon activity that was “arguably protected or prohibited by”
143
the NLRA’s unfair labor practice provisions.
In other words,
the California law did not directly relate to an area that the NLRA
protects or prohibits through its section 8(a) and 8(b) unfair labor
144
practice provisions.
The Court concluded that the NLRA
preempted the state law entirely because Congress, intending a
laissez-faire approach to some aspects of labor relations, largely left
145
uncoercive speech unregulated.
Similarly, in Linn and Austin, the
Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended to leave less
egregious defamations unregulated by state defamation law.
Finally, the NLRA’s definition of “labor dispute,” both on the
NLRA’s face and as interpreted by the Supreme Court in analogous
146
Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLA) cases, in no way limits the NLRA’s
preemptive reach to activities that are “arguably protected or
prohibited by” its unfair labor practice provisions. While the
Supreme Court has not spoken directly on the issue in the NLRA
defamation defense context, the Court’s NLA decisions provide
helpful analogies that underscore the irrelevance of the “arguably
147
protected or prohibited by” inquiry. The NLA is analogous to the
NLRA because the NLA and NLRA definitions of “labor dispute” are
virtually identical and federal courts have interpreted the definitions
140. 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
141. Id. at 2412.
142. Id. at 2410, 2417–18.
143. Id. at 2412.
144. Id. at 2414–15.
145. See id. at 2417 (noting that while the NLRB “has policed a narrow zone of
speech to ensure free and fair elections,” the overwhelming emphasis is on
unbounded speech).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006).
147. The NLA establishes a rigorous procedure that largely restricts federal courts
from issuing an injunction in “a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”
29 U.S.C. § 104. The NLA states in relevant part that “[n]o court of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to
prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute . . . from
doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: . . . (e) Giving
publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by
advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or
violence.” Id.
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148

as consistent with each other.
Moreover, similar to the NLRA
defamation defense, the NLA’s partial protection against injunctions
only applies when there is a labor dispute.
In the NLA context, the Supreme Court has clarified that even
activity that is “neither protected nor prohibited” by the NLRA’s
unfair labor practice provisions can fit into the definition of a NLRA
or NLA “labor dispute.” In Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v.
149
International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, union members participated in a
work stoppage in 1981 as a protest against the Soviet Union’s invasion
150
of Afghanistan. The employer requested an injunction to end the
151
work stoppage, arguing that “the political motivation underlying
the Union’s work stoppage” removed the controversy from the NLA’s
152
“labor dispute” definition. The employer analogized to the NLRA
and reasoned that because the work stoppage was politically
motivated, it would not be protected by the NLRA’s unfair labor
practices provisions and therefore did not qualify as a “labor dispute”
153
under the NLRA or the NLA.
The Jacksonville Court rejected the
employer’s argument, stating that “[t]he objective of the concerted
activity is relevant in determining whether such activity is [protected
or prohibited by the NLRA’s unfair labor practice provisions], but not
in determining whether the activity is a ‘labor dispute’ under [NLRA
154
section] 2(9).”
B. Applies Even When No Employer-Employee Relationship
Exists Between Disputants
Unlike some aspects of the NLRA, the NLRA defamation defense
does not distinguish between primary and secondary labor disputes
and applies regardless of whether an employer-employee relationship
exists between parties to a dispute. Thus, an employee or worker

148. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S.
702, 711 n.11 (1982) (“[T]he definition of a ‘labor dispute’ in § 2(9) of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 152(9), is virtually identical to that in § 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c), and the two provisions have been construed consistently with
one another.”); see also Richard Litvin, Fearful Asymmetry: Employee Free Choice and
Employer Profitability in First National Maintenance, 58 IND. L.J. 433, 475 (1983)
(“Nothing in the legislative history of the [NLRA] suggests that Congress intended
‘terms and conditions of employment’ to carry a narrower meaning than it had in
Norris-LaGuardia . . . .”).
149. 457 U.S. 702 (1982).
150. Id. at 704–05.
151. The employer argued in part that the work stoppage violated its collective
bargaining agreement with the union. Id. at 706.
152. Id. at 708–09.
153. Id. 709–10.
154. Id. at 712 n.11.
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organization engaged in a labor dispute can assert the NLRA
defamation defense in response to a defamation suit even when the
allegedly defamatory statements did not target a primary employer.
In 1947, Congress amended the NLRA to differentiate between
primary disputes and secondary disputes within the broader
155
Specifically, the addition of
definition of a NLRA “labor dispute.”
NLRA section 8(b)(4) prohibited labor organizations from engaging
in certain activities, such as boycotting and picketing, that are
156
directed toward a non-primary employer.
NLRA section 8(b)(4)’s
publicity proviso clarifies that it does not “prohibit publicity,
other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public . . . that a product or products are produced by an employer
with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are
157
distributed by another employer . . . .” Thus, NLRA section 8(b)(4)
requires the NLRB to distinguish between primary and non-primary
158
labor disputes.
However, courts do not have to make such a
distinction to apply the NLRA defamation defense to state
defamation claims.
Several cases demonstrate how the NLRA defamation defense may
be applied even when no employer-employee relationship exists
between parties to a dispute. For instance, in Johnston Development
159
Group, Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1578, neutral employers brought
defamation claims against a union after they successfully won an
160
The court applied the NLRA
injunction against the union.
defamation defense to the neutral employers’ defamation claim and
161
denied the plaintiffs’ application for relief.
155. See Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 623-26 (1967)
(discussing Congress’s 1947 amendments to the NLRA, which differentiated between
primary and secondary disputes, as responses to the perception that the NLA’s
“broad immunity” had led to “labor abuses”).
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006) (describing activities which constitute unfair
labor practices for a labor organization).
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. Other sections of the NLRA also require the NLRB to distinguish between
primary and secondary disputes. See, e.g., Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB,
456 U.S. 645, 665 (1982) (applying NLRA section 8(e) to hold that “employees
working for firms with whom a construction union has a primary dispute are
protected against secondary picketing designed to force them off their current job”);
N. PETER LAREAU, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE § 12.05 (Matthew
Bender, 2d ed. 2009) (“Section 8(g) also does not apply to a union’s picketing at the
premises of a health care employer, if the picketing is aimed at the employees of
another employer, present on the health care employer’s premises, with whom the
union has a primary dispute.”).
159. 712 F. Supp. 1174 (D.N.J. 1989).
160. See id. at 1176 (explaining that the NLRB had previously filed an injunction
with the court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(l)).
161. Id. at 1184.
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Similarly, in San Antonio Community Hospital v. Southern California
162
District Council of Carpenters, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit applied the NLRA defamation defense to allegedly
defamatory statements made about an entity with which a union did
163
not have a primary dispute. The union had a primary dispute with
Best Interiors, a construction subcontractor of San Antonio
164
Community Hospital.
To put pressure on the subcontractor,
the union displayed a banner outside the hospital that stated in large
165
capital letters that the “medical facility [was] full of rats.”
The banner stated in smaller letters that the union had a dispute with
166
Best Interiors.
The hospital sued the union, raising state
defamation claims and requesting that the court enjoin the union
167
from displaying the banner. The San Antonio court found that the
hospital met the NLRA defamation defense’s heightened standard of
168
proof on the defamation claim and granted the injunction.
169
In Hasbrouck v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 232, the Ninth Circuit
applied the defense even though the company that the union
targeted with its statements had no employees at the time the
170
statements were made.
That case involved a union that had
historically tried to “persuade” Hasbrouck, a sheet metal and furnace
171
business, to hire members of the union. Hasbrouck refused to hire
anyone at all and instead operated almost exclusively as a one-man
172
shop. After the union placed Hasbrouck on a “Do Not Patronize”
173
list, Hasbrouck brought a defamation suit and argued that the
174
NLRA defamation defense did not apply.
Citing the “history of
discussion between both sides regarding the employment situation in
plaintiff’s furnace shop,” the Ninth Circuit applied the NLRA

162. 125 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 1997).
163. Id. at 1233.
164. Id. at 1232–33.
165. Id. at 1233.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 1235. The court stated, “Because the injunction must be predicated
on the Hospital’s defamation claims, the Supreme Court’s decisions in [Linn and
Austin] come into play. These cases stand for the general proposition that ‘libel
actions under state law [are] pre-empted by the federal labor laws to the extent that
the State [seeks] to make actionable defamatory statements in labor disputes which
[do not meet the heightened standard of proof].’” Id. (quoting Old Dominion
Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 (1974)).
169. 586 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1978).
170. Id. at 692, 694.
171. Id. at 694.
172. Id. at 692.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 692–94.
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175

defamation defense.
It determined that the defense applied
because “[u]nder the broad statutory definition, this was a [NLRA]
176
‘labor dispute’ as a matter of law.”
Similarly, courts apply the NLRA defamation defense to allegedly
defamatory statements made during union area standards campaigns
despite the fact that those campaigns sometimes do not involve
a direct employment relationship between members or future
177
members of the union and the targeted company. Area standards
disputes often involve union attempts to pressure companies in the
same industry to meet “area standards” with respect to wages and
178
benefits. In Ruzicka Electric & Sons, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of
179
Electrical Workers, Local 1, an Eighth Circuit case, such a dispute
existed between International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 1, which represents eastern Missouri electricians, and Ruzicka
180
Electric & Sons, a Missouri electrical contractor.
In the course
of the union’s efforts to expose the company for paying
181
“substandard wages and fringe benefits,” a union representative
told parties who may have contracted with Ruzicka that Ruzicka’s
performance on another project was “shoddy,” “dangerous,”
182
183
and “against the code.” Applying the NLRA defamation defense,
the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of Ruzicka’s
184
defamation claim.

175. Id. at 694.
176. Id.
177. For examples of cases where the court applied the NLRA defamation defense
to statements made during area standards disputes, see Barss v. Tosches, 785 F.2d 20
(1st Cir. 1986), and Manchester Resorts, L.P. v. Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters,
No. 02-CV-1987-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2392 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2003).
178. See Tzvi Mackson-Landsberg, Note, Is a Giant Inflatable Rat an Unlawful
Secondary Picket Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act?,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1519, 1525–26 n.37 (2006) (stating that area standards
campaigns are “sometimes directed at issues other than organizing workers” and
focus on targeting a company for “undermining the living standards of others in the
area by paying their workers substandard wages or by patronizing those who do”);
see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 206 n.42 (1978) (“[T]he right to organize is at the very core of the
purpose for which the NLRA was enacted. Area-standards picketing, in contrast, has
only recently been recognized as a § 7 right.”).
179. 427 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 2005).
180. Id. at 513.
181. Id. at 514.
182. Id. at 517.
183. Id. at 523.
184. Id.
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Applies Even When No Labor Organization Is Involved

Finally, the NLRA defamation defense applies even when allegedly
185
defamatory statements do not involve a NLRA “labor organization”
in any way. Under the NLRA’s definition of “labor dispute,” a labor
dispute may arise without participation of a NLRA labor organization.
Moreover, employees can engage in NLRA concerted activity without
the involvement of a labor organization. The NLRA, and by
extension, the NLRA defamation defense, requires “concerted”
186
activity by or on behalf of more than one employee.
Specifically,
NLRA section 7 grants employees a right to “engage in concerted
activities to persuade other employees to join for their mutual aid
187
and protection.” Nothing in the NLRA, however, requires the
involvement of a labor organization to satisfy the NLRA
concertedness requirement.
In fact, scholars have noted that one of the “best-kept secrets of
labor law” is that the NLRA even protects certain collective activities
that are not aimed at forming a labor organization or bargaining with
188
an employer.
Both the NLRB and the Supreme Court have
185. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2006) (defining “labor organization” as “any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or
plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work”).
186. Thus, the efforts of one employee acting on his or her own behalf are not
recognized by the NLRA and therefore are unlikely to fall under the protection of
the NLRA defamation defense. The NLRA defamation defense, however, can apply
to one employee acting on behalf of other employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 151; NLRB v.
City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984) (concluding that a sole employee can
engage in concerted activity in some circumstances); Mushroom Transp. Co. v.
NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (“It is not questioned that a conversation
may constitute a concerted activity although it involves only a speaker and a listener,
but to qualify as such, it must appear at the very least that it was engaged in with the
object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some
relation to group action in the interest of the employees.”). For a critique arguing
that judicial interpretations of NLRA section 7 are too narrow, see Estlund, Employee
Interests, supra note 30, at 924–25 (“Section 7 is meant to protect employees who act
together to advance the interests they share with their co-workers. The notion that
employees’ shared interests extend only to their wages and working conditions is
compelled neither by the language nor by the intent of section 7, and should be
rejected.”).
187. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 277 (1974)
(emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v. Drivers Local Union 639, 362 U.S. 274, 279
(1960)). The cases involving allegedly defamatory statements of labor organizations
that were discussed in the previous Section of this Article assumed concerted activity.
188. William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century:
Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 267 n.35 (2002)
[hereinafter Corbett, Waiting] (citing scholarship which notes that people are often
unaware of NLRA protection in non-union settings). But see William R. Corbett,
The Narrowing of the National Labor Relations Act: Maintaining Workplace Decorum and
Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 23, 27 (2006) (“The recent trends,
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confirmed that the NLRA applies to some collective activity among
189
employees that does not involve labor organizations in any way.
In 1997, for instance, the NLRB concluded that an employer
committed a NLRA unfair labor practice by firing a non-union
employee who had written an email to co-workers to gain support for
190
a proposed change to the company’s vacation policy.
Because the NLRA is often viewed as the law of labor unions,
the NLRA’s broader protections of collective activity, including
speech, is often overlooked. Cynthia Estlund has noted that:
The NLRA is rarely used by and is largely unfamiliar to nonunion
employees outside the organizing context. But [NLRA] section 7 is
a potentially significant source of free speech rights in the
workplace on issues of concern to workers; it protects speech about
unionization or other forms of employee representation, discussion
191
of work-related grievances, and petitioning for their redress.

Regardless of the frequency of its use in non-union settings, NLRA
section 7 undoubtedly applies to collective activity in workplaces
192
whether or not there is union involvement.
While the Supreme Court has not directly considered whether the
NLRA defamation defense applies to the activities of non-labor
organizations, its consideration of the issue in an analogous situation
suggests that the defense applies to new (non-union) forms of worker
organizations engaging in collective activity. In New Negro Alliance v.
193
Sanitary Grocery Co., one of the Court’s earliest cases defining what
constitutes a NLA “labor dispute,” the Supreme Court considered
whether the activity of non-labor organizations falls within the NLA’s

decisions, and appointments at the NLRB indicate that the NLRA’s future as a source
of rights and protections for nonunion workers will be insignificant at best.”).
189. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 15–17 (1962) (extending
NLRA section 7 protection to non-union employees); Alex B. Long,
The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in
the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 941 (2007) (“On several occasions, the NLRB has
reaffirmed that [NLRA section 7] protects non-union employees.”). But see IBM
Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004) (overruling a previous NLRB decision which
provided non-employees the right to have a representative present during
investigatory interviews that could lead to discipline).
190. Timekeeping Systems, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 244–45 (1997); see also Corbett,
Waiting, supra note 188, at 287–91 (discussing the NLRA’s application to new forms
of communication and technology); Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation
and American Workers: Employee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287,
314 (2007) (discussing the protection of employee blogging about work-related
issues in some circumstances).
191. Estlund, Free Speech, supra note 81, at 118–19.
192. See Corbett, Waiting, supra note 188, at 266–67 (adding that NLRA section 7,
therefore, may be a source of “reinvigoration of the NLRA”).
193. 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
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194

definition.
It concluded that non-labor organizations that engage
in labor disputes can benefit from the NLA’s partial protection from
195
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court explicitly
injunctions.
acknowledged that a labor dispute may exist even when no labor
196
organization is involved. The New Negro Alliance (the “Alliance”),
a civil rights group, demanded that Sanitary Grocery Company
(the “Grocery”) respond to racial inequities in its workplace by hiring
197
African-American clerks in some of its stores.
When the Grocery
198
did not respond to this request, the Alliance sent a representative to
199
picket with a placard in front of one of the Grocery’s stores.
The placard said, “Do Your Part! Buy Where You Can Work!
200
No Negroes Employed Here!” The Alliance also communicated to
the Grocery that it would initiate a similar picket at two other store
201
locations.
The Grocery requested a court injunction to stop the
202
The lower court granted the injunction, concluding
picketing.
that the NLA did not apply because the activity did not constitute a
203
labor dispute under the NLA, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the dispute was a NLA
204
labor dispute. The Court stated:
The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on the
part of persons of any race, color, or persuasion, and the removal
of discriminations against them by reason of their race or religious
beliefs is quite as important to those concerned as fairness and
equity in terms and conditions of employment can be to trade or
205
craft unions or any form of labor organization or association.

By holding that the dispute fell within the definition of a NLA
labor dispute, the Alliance Court concluded that the dispute involved
terms or conditions of employment despite the fact that the Alliance
members were not part of a labor organization and “were not
asserting economic interests commonly associated with labor
206
unions.”
194. Id. at 559–63.
195. Id. at 562–63.
196. Id. at 559–61.
197. Id. at 554–56.
198. Id. at 556.
199. Id. at 556–57.
200. Id. at 557.
201. Id. at 556–57.
202. Id. at 554.
203. Id. at 554, 559.
204. Id. at 561–63.
205. Id. at 561.
206. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S.
702, 714 (1982) (discussing the Alliance Court’s reasoning); Seth Kupferberg, Political
Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685, 720–21 (1985) (discussing
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D. Two Examples
It may be counterintuitive to some that the NLRA defamation
defense can apply both to new union organizing strategies that
intend to circumvent the NLRB and to new worker organizations that
do not want to be considered NLRA-regulated labor organizations.
Nonetheless, this Section demonstrates the defense’s broad reach to
these contemporary arenas. Specifically, this Section describes a key
component of (1) new union strategies (corporate campaigns) and
(2) the most common new worker organization (worker centers),
and explains how the NLRA defamation defense could provide,
and in some cases already has provided, protection for these kinds of
collective activity.
1.

Union corporate campaigns
Frustrated with the NLRA and the NLRB in particular, some labor
207
unions have called for the NLRA’s retirement.
In fact, “many of
the more activist organizing unions have been selectively boycotting
208
the [NLRB] for quite some time.” Due in part to their frustration
with the NLRA and the NLRB, some labor unions have shifted
their organizing efforts away from strategies involving the NLRB
and are increasingly using “corporate campaigns” to achieve
209
their collective activity goals.
Corporate campaigns “involve the
use of non-traditional methods to secure tactical gains in organizing
210
Estlund describes union corporate and
and bargaining.”
comprehensive campaigns in the following way:
The “corporate campaign” . . . seeks concessions from employers by
targeting directors, customers, suppliers, lenders, and investors

Alliance and stating that the “Supreme Court extended the term ‘labor dispute’ in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act beyond the terms and conditions of employment in the
sense of wages, hours, unionization or betterment of working conditions. . . . [T]he
Court found that the dispute was clearly over conditions of employment and stated
that the Act does not concern itself with the background or the motives of the
dispute” (internal quotations omitted)).
207. See Christopher Ruiz Cameron et al., At Age Seventy, Should the National Labor
Relations Act Be Retired: Proceedings of the 2005 Annual Meeting, Association of American
Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
121, 137 (2005) (referring to debate among union lawyers about “whether or not to
give up, if not on the Act, then on the NLRB”).
208. Id.
209. See Sanford M. Jacoby, The Future of Labor and Finance, 30 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 111, 119 (2008) (“Today, these campaigns are most closely associated with
Change To Win and its constituent unions, chiefly the Food and Commercial
Workers (UFCW), the Laborers (LIUNA), SEIU, the Teamsters, and UNITE-HERE.
Some AFL-CIO unions, notably the Steelworkers, also have embraced the
approach.”).
210. Id.
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with publicity and other forms of pressure. A broader term—the
“comprehensive campaign”—may better describe campaigns that
appeal directly to the public by way of rallies, pickets, speeches, and
leafleting in public streets and parks, often with the active support
of churches and other community organizations outside the labor
211
movement itself.

Corporate campaigns sometimes use aggressive and potentially
defamatory publicity as part of union efforts to pressure employers to
212
agree to union demands.
As one management attorney recently
claimed, “[U]nions are increasingly engaging in . . . tactics[] such
as . . . mailing defamatory letters about a company to potential
213
customers.”
Union tactics also include “embarrassing a firm’s
executives and business partners” and publicizing union-initiated
214
lawsuits and government complaints against employers.
Given the intensity and range of these information-based publicity
tactics, employers—be they primary, secondary, or neutral
215
employers—often find them highly offensive.
Not surprisingly,
union corporate campaigns have led to defamation lawsuits against
216
unions and union members.
Indeed, some argue that the rise in
defamation suits against unions is a response to corporate
211. Estlund, Ossification, supra note 4, at 1605.
212. See JAROL B. MANHEIM, TRENDS IN UNION CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS: A BRIEFING
BOOK 16–17 (2005), available at http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/
06union_campaigns.htm (listing common union tactics); Geri L. Dreiling, Fighting
Fire with Fire: When Unions Turn Up the Heat, Companies Fight Back With Lawsuits,
92 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (2006) (stating that “corporate campaigns can ‘include
investigations into the company, including background information a company
would not like the public to see’”).
213. Tresa Baldas, Court Rulings, Regulatory Actions Fuel Labor Battles, Nat’l L.J., Nov.
10, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005552022;
see also Professional Janitorial Service Files Lawsuit Against SEIU, CLEANLINK, May 4, 2007,
http://www.cleanlink.com/news/article.asp?id=6678&keywords=union,%20seiu,%20
lawsuit (reporting a statement made by an employer that company officials were
“looking forward to seeing what a Texas jury thinks of the SEIU’s campaign to
defame . . . our company”).
214. Jacoby, supra note 209, at 119–20.
215. See More, supra note 118, at 214 (“Creating a media spectacle that highlights
the issues at stake in a labor dispute and embarrasses the target employer
often involves creative appropriation of the corporation’s logo or motto.”);
see also Paul Snitzer, New Union Tactics: Mock Funerals, Lies About Dirty Laundry and
Other Low Blows, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, March 27, 2008, available at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/New+Union+Tactics%3a+Mock+Funerals%2c+Lies+
About+Dirty+Laundry+And+Other...-a0177154490 (“Union-sponsored corporate
campaigns against healthcare employers are intended to embarrass the employers in
the public eye by portraying them as some type of ‘evildoer’ to be shunned.”).
216. See Cintas v. UNITE, No. 1:04-CV-00317, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45435, at *3-6
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 16, 2005) (referring to a defamation claim brought in the context of
a corporate campaign); Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm
Workers’ Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing
Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 1, 63 (2005) (noting that corporate campaigns often
generate bad publicity which “may become the basis for a defamation lawsuit”).
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217

campaigns.
A recent newspaper article reported that employers
believe defamation suits are merited as a response to such conduct
as posting “nasty fliers and Internet comments” that unfairly
218
harm employers’ reputations.
The article further reported that,
“as unions become more proficient in conducting corporate
campaigns, more employers are willing to fight back by alleging
219
[that] union tactics violate state laws against slander.”
Also, some
argue that “[p]robably the most common employer response to false
and distorted corporate campaign tactics has been to sue for
220
defamation under state law.”
This commentary suggests that the
stakes for an effective defense against defamation suits are
221
particularly high today.
Despite widespread pessimism regarding the continued relevance
of the NLRA for unions involved in corporate campaigns, some
courts adjudicating cases involving union corporate campaigns and
the case analysis in the previous Sections of this Part suggest
otherwise. In Monterey Plaza Hotel v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant
222
Employees Local 483, for example, a California appellate court
applied the NLRA defamation defense to a defamation claim
concerning union statements made on television that implicated the
223
employer in illegal activity.

217. See Dreiling, supra note 212, at 18 (arguing that “pulling out the legal stops
can pay off for companies”); More, supra note 118, at 215 (stating that the
“broadening of labor’s campaign tactics . . . significantly expands the number of legal
targets available to an employer”); Baldas, supra note 213 (stating that “companies
are using litigation to ‘spend the union into the ground’”).
218. L.M. Sixel, Free Speech Too Nasty?, HOUSTON CHRON., May 17, 2007.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Baskin & Northrup, supra note 24, at 218; see also Ray Stern, In Its War
for New Members, a Labor Union Is Using Dirty Tricks to Turn Hispanics Against Bashas’,
PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008 (“In response to the corporate campaign, Bashas’
slapped the UFCW and its most strident advocates with a defamation lawsuit last
month.”).
221. It is important to note that some believe that retaliatory defamation lawsuits
are on the rise because of the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in BE&K Construction
Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002). See Paul Salvatore & Brian Rauch, Taking A Page
From the Unions’ Playbook: Employers Litigating Against Union Corporate Campaigns,
METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Apr. 2007, at 49 (citing the Supreme Court’s BE&K decision
and stating that “[c]onsequently, employers have been filing an increased number of
lawsuits against organizing tactics”). The Supreme Court’s holding in BE&K made it
more difficult to prove to the NLRB that an employer filed a lawsuit (including a
state defamation lawsuit) as a means to retaliate against employees who had engaged
in NLRA-recognized collective action. See William B. Gould IV, Labor Law and Its
Limits: Some Proposals for Reform, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 667, 671 (2003) (referring to
defamation suits, stating that the NLRB’s ability “to limit such conduct” has been
“reigned” in by the BE&K case).
222. 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10 (Ct. App. 1999).
223. Id. at 14–16.
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In another corporate campaign case, Beverly Hills Foodland v. United
224
Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 655, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s application of the NLRA defamation
defense even though allegedly defamatory statements were made
225
after the union organizing efforts had ended.
In that case, the
union’s public statements about the employer suggested that the
226
employer was “unfair to black employees.” The food market sued,
arguing that this language was defamatory and that the NLRA
defamation defense and its heightened standard of proof did not
apply because the statements were made after the termination of the
227
union’s organizing efforts.
The Eighth Circuit rejected the
employer’s argument and determined that the statements “occurred
228
within the context of a ‘labor dispute.’”
The court stated that
“[c]ourts have routinely found that a labor dispute exists in situations
229
which do not involve any organizing activities by a union.”
The application of the NLRA defamation defense in the corporate
campaign context demonstrates the continuing relevance of the
NLRA defamation defense despite union attempts to move away from
the NLRA in other areas. Without the defense, union efforts to
promote collective activity through corporate campaigns would not
be protected from the full reach of state defamation lawsuits.
2.

Worker centers
Worker centers often view themselves as alternatives to unions and
230
NLRA labor organizations.
These centers exemplify the typical
231
form of alternative worker organizations.
Janice Fine, after
studying more than 130 worker centers in the United States,
identified those centers as “community-based mediating institutions
that provide support to and organize among communities of
224. 39 F.3d 191 (8th Cir. 1994).
225. See id. at 193 (noting that after the union failed to organize food market
employees, it sent the employer a letter notifying it “that the Union was terminating
its organizational efforts”).
226. Id. at 194.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 194–95.
229. Id.
230. See Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373,
397 (2008).
231. For a discussion of alternative worker organizations, see generally JENNIFER
GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005); Scott
Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 891 (2008);
Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project,
and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995); Alan Hyde,
New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States: Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 385 (2005–06).
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232

low-wage workers.”
The groups that worker centers focus on—
low-wage workers and other workers in transitory industries—are
233
often not strategic or feasible targets for labor unions. Nonetheless,
worker centers and unions have engaged in collaborations in the past
234
and may do so more often in the future.
Because worker center
members are often at the bottom end of the labor market, worker
centers’ activities often target some of the most severe labor and
employment law abuses through lawsuits, organizing efforts, and
235
legislative advocacy.
Moreover, worker centers organize some of
the most vulnerable participants in the U.S. labor market, including
undocumented workers who do not have legal authorization to work
236
in the United States. Thus, for many constituencies, these centers
represent a critical new institution that protects workers and
promotes collective activity.
A viable defense against defamation suits is likely to become more
critical for worker centers. Similar to union corporate campaigns,
worker centers often use aggressive publicity and other forms of
speech to pressure employers to change their employment
237
practices.
These efforts address a wide range of workplace-related
issues, from wages and vacation time to health and safety in the
238
Some of the actions of worker centers may offend
workplace.
239
employers and provoke lawsuits.
Even though they are still
relatively new entrants to the workplace relations scene, worker

232. JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS:
THE DREAM 11 (2006).

ORGANIZING NEW COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF

233. See Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L.
REV. 355, 361–62 (2008) (noting the rise of worker centers in the context of
weakening unions).
234. See Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies
of the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 513 (2006) (“The recent
historic split within the AFL-CIO presents a great opportunity for worker centers to
forge new alliances with unions and become an integral part of the emerging new
Labor Movement.”).
235. See Miriam A. Cherry, Working (with) Workers: Implementing Theory, 41 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 731, 733–34 (2008).
236. See id. at 733 (“These worker centers usually assist low-wage or immigrant
workers, the most underserved and vulnerable groups.”).
237. See, e.g., Redeye Grill, L.P. v. Rest. Opportunities Ctr., No. 117382/05, 2006
WL 2726823, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 16, 2006) (describing how a worker
organization used “megaphones, whistles and a nine-foot inflatable skunk”
to announce that it was filing a lawsuit to recover “stolen tips”).
238. See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375,
379–80 (2007) (describing the efforts of a group of Houston janitors to gain a variety
of benefits).
239. See, e.g., Redeye Grill, 2006 WL 2726823, at *1 (describing the plaintiff
restaurant’s assertion that the picketing worker organization was “motivated by the
desire to drive business away from [the restaurant]”).
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centers and their members have already faced defamation suits in
240
response to their information-based tactics.
One might argue that worker centers must qualify as NLRA
“labor organizations” before they may take advantage of the NLRA
defamation defense, and there is an ongoing debate over whether
241
worker centers can be included as such an organization. If they are
included, worker center activities would be subject to NLRA
242
restrictions.
Nevertheless, according to this Article’s legal
243
analysis, inquiry into whether the NLRA defamation defense applies
has nothing to do with whether the defamation defendant is a NLRA
labor organization.
Rather, courts should apply the NLRA
defamation defense to defamation suits against worker centers and
their members as long as the allegedly defamatory statements are
made during a labor dispute involving concerted activity.
The allegedly defamatory statements attributed to worker centers
and their members are often made during a labor dispute. That is,
those statements are often made in the context of “any controversy
244
concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment.” Scholars
have observed that many worker center activities are also likely to fall
within the NLRA’s broad definition of concerted activity for mutual
245
aid and protection.
Among other things, worker centers file legal
claims on behalf of groups of employees, organize employees around
their mutual interests, and engage in confrontations with employers,
246
including pickets, walkouts, and boycotts.
Although an exhaustive analysis of defamation suits against worker
centers is beyond the scope of this Article, worker centers have raised
247
the NLRA defamation defense in at least two cases.
In one case,
240. The Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York, for instance, has “faced
a multitude of lawsuits for its activity.” LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH FUND,
PAPER WORK CENTER THESIS, THE WORKER CENTER MOVEMENT AND TRADITIONAL
LABOR LAWS 17 (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/lerf/
WorkCentersThesis; see also Sameer Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance
Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879, 1896 (2007) (stating that lawyers have defended
worker centers against defamation lawsuits).
241. For an argument that worker centers are NLRA “labor organizations,”
see David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers: Emerging Labor Organizations—Until They Confront
the National Labor Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 469 (2006).
242. See id. at 499 (discussing obstacles that NLRA labor organizations face).
243. See discussion supra Part III.C.
244. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (2006).
245. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 241, at 482 (referring to Jennifer Gordon and
Janice Fine’s “recogni[tion] that worker centers do encourage pickets, organizing,
boycotts, strikes, and other forms of concerted activity”).
246. Id. at 482, 497, 504.
247. Garment Workers Ctr. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506 (Ct. App.
2004); Park v. Kor. Immigrant Workers Advocates, No. B154294, 2002 WL 938274
(Cal. Ct. App. May 9, 2002).
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for example, an employer sued several non-profit workers’ rights
entities claiming, among other things, that the entities “defamed
[the employer] by proclaiming in their demonstrations, leafleting,
press releases and web site postings [that the employer] owed these
workers substantial amounts of unpaid wages and other employment
248
benefits for sewing clothes.” In the other case, an employer sued a
worker center for its allegedly defamatory statements that the
249
employer did not properly remedy wage violations.
Among other
things the worker center members stated, “Hey, Hey, Ho, Ho,
250
Exploitation’s got to go,” in front of the employer’s restaurant. It is
unknown how these courts would have responded to the defamation
defendants’ invocation of the NLRA defamation defense because the
cases were resolved before the courts adjudicated the issues.
Nonetheless, according to the foregoing analysis, courts can apply the
NLRA defamation defense in defamation cases against worker centers
and their members regardless of whether worker centers constitute
NLRA labor organizations.
It is important to preserve the NLRA defamation defense, given
Congress’s intent to protect collective activity and given the relevance
of the defense to traditional as well as new forms of worker
organizations and union strategies. While perhaps not quite a
“diamond in the rough,” the defense provides at least some
protection for collective activity at a time when the NLRA is already
251
gasping for air. Nevertheless, as the following Part discusses, some
recent proposals for reforms, which are intended to enhance
protections for collective activity, may unintentionally undermine the
defamation defense and the important protection it provides for
collective activity.
IV. THE PERILS OF A NARROWER NLRA PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
Proposals to modernize the NLRA such that it better supports
collective activity in the workplace should take care to explicitly retain
the NLRA defamation defense. To illustrate this point, this Article
shows how an oft-cited proposal to narrow the NLRA’s preemption
doctrine may unintentionally imperil the NLRA defamation defense
and its unrealized potential.

248. Garment Workers, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 508.
249. Park, 2002 WL 938274, at *2.
250. Id. at *3.
251. See Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 101–10
(1993) (describing the decline of the NLRA).

2009]

THE NLRA DEFAMATION DEFENSE

39

A. Prior Scholarship on the NLRA’s Preemption Doctrine
While most scholarship on NLRA’s preemption of state law has
historically argued for a broad reading of NLRA preemption and,
therefore, for leaving little room for state regulation of labor
252
relations, some have recently criticized the breadth of the NLRA’s
preemptive reach and have called for increased state law
253
intervention.
Historically, many labor scholars argued that the
NLRA’s policies promoting collective activity were best served by a
uniform federal regime of regulation that would minimize local-level
inexperience with, and biases against, collective activity among
254
employees.
More recently, however, some have called for
decreased NLRA preemption of state laws, often focusing on the
opportunities less preemption would create for state legislation
255
aimed at fostering collective activity in more labor-friendly states.
Moreover, a few such calls contend that broad readings of NLRA
256
preemption often “block[] . . . state common law innovation” that
could foster collective activity among employees in the workplace.
These scholars, however, often do not specifically address how a
simplistic application of a narrower NLRA preemption doctrine,
albeit intended to promote collective activity, may unintentionally
decrease the availability of the NLRA defamation defense.
This oversight may in part be due to the fact that the Supreme
Court’s Linn and Austin cases are often cited as exceptions to the
257
NLRA’s broad preemption doctrine. Thus, those calling for further
narrowing of the NLRA’s preemption doctrine may assume that the
252. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian
Renaissance or Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 518 (1986).
253. See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman, Will Labor Fare Better Under State Labor Relations
Law?, 58 PROCS. LAB. & EMP. REL. ASS’N ANN. MEETING 125 (2006) (arguing that labor
would fare better under state labor relations law); Paul Secunda, Toward the Viability
of State-Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United
States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209, 240 (2007) (arguing that state legislation
regarding “captive audience meetings” should not be preempted by the NLRA);
Silverstein, supra note 27, at 4 (challenging the traditional protocol for federal
regulation of labor relations). For an example of state-level efforts to circumvent
broad federal preemption, see generally Matthew T. Bodie, The Potential for State
Labor Law: The New York Greengrocer Code of Conduct, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 183
(2003).
254. See, e.g., Harry H. Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. CHI. L. REV.
542, 542 (1959) (arguing that labor regulation should be an “exclusive, nation-wide
regime” and that state intervention should be minimal).
255. See Secunda, supra note 253, at 231–48; see also Silverstein, supra note 27, at 3
(calling for scholars to “rethink the traditional belief in strong federal preemption as
beneficial for organized labor and as necessary to promote collective bargaining”).
256. See Estlund, Ossification, supra note 4, at 1530–31 (referring to scholarship
that calls for common law protection of collective activity).
257. See, e.g., Silverstein, supra note 27, at 21–22.
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defamation context would proceed unaltered by a new doctrine that
further narrows NLRA preemption. But, the Supreme Court’s Linn
and Austin decisions did not simply present an exception to broad
preemption. Rather, those decisions affirm that, while the NLRA
defamation defense is narrow in that it does not preempt egregious
defamation cases, it is broad in that it does entirely preempt less
egregious defamation cases.
B. The Continuum Proposal
According to an oft-cited proposal for narrowing the NLRA
preemption doctrine to better protect collective activity—referred to
here as the “continuum proposal”—states should be “free to regulate
labor relations, in parallel with the NLRA and beyond, except where
state law conflicts with an interest protected by the NLRA or where
there is a continuum of federal protection-prohibition across the
258
subject area to which the state law applies.” Accordingly, the NLRA
should continue to preempt state regulation of activities that
Congress intended the NLRA to regulate, in every situation, through
explicit protections or prohibitions.
For example, under the
continuum proposal, the NLRA should continue to preempt
picketing because all picketing activity is either explicitly protected by
or explicitly prohibited by the NLRA. Picketing thus falls on the
259
continuum of federal protection or prohibition.
On the other hand, this proposal recommends that the NLRA
should not preempt state regulatory interventions regarding activities
that Congress did not intend the NLRA to directly regulate in every
260
circumstance.
These activities, such as union access to an
employer’s premises, do not fall on the protected or prohibited
261
continuum.
Sometimes union access to an employer’s premises is
262
States,
neither explicitly protected nor prohibited by the NLRA.
according to this view, should be able to fully regulate the “area

258. Gottesman, supra note 9, at 426 (emphasis added). Scholars have widely
cited Gottesman’s NLRA preemption proposal. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Michael
M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in the Battle over Wal-Mart, 92 MINN. L. REV.
1502, 1507 n.20 (2008); Wilson McLeod, Rekindling Labor Law Successorship in an Era
of Decline, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 271, 343 (1994); David A. Morand, Questioning the
Preemption Doctrine: Opportunities for State-Level Labor Law Initiatives, 5 WIDENER J. PUB.
L. 35, 52 (1995); Secunda, supra note 253, at 213.
259. Gottesman, supra note 9, at 357.
260. Id. at 359–60.
261. Id. at 359.
262. Id. at 358.
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beyond” those that the federal government comprehensively
263
regulates.
Yet, encouraging courts to engage in this type of NLRA
preemption analysis could unintentionally lead to the deterioration
of the NLRA defamation defense. This is because such an analysis of
whether an activity is protected or prohibited by the NLRA is difficult
in the common law world of state defamation law. Currently, state
courts must consider whether the allegedly defamatory statements
were made during a labor dispute in order to decide whether to
264
apply the NLRA defamation defense. But a simplistic application of
the continuum proposal may lead courts to inquire, on a case-by-case
basis, whether the NLRB would protect or prohibit particular
statements. Speech is sometimes NLRB-regulated and is sometimes
entirely unregulated by the NLRB. The proposal could, therefore,
unintentionally lead courts to assess whether the NLRA’s unfair labor
practice provisions under NLRA section 8(a) or 8(b) would “arguably
protect or prohibit” the allegedly defamatory speech in order to
decide whether to apply the NLRA defamation defense. This would
entail a hypothetical analysis similar to the following: if an employee
experienced an adverse employment action because of allegedly
defamatory statements, would the NLRB interpret the NLRA’s unfair
labor practice provisions to protect that employee from the adverse
employment action? If the answer is yes, the activity is federally
regulated by the NLRA and NLRA defamation defense would apply.
If the answer is no, the activity is not federally regulated and the
NLRA defamation defense would not apply. But as the cases
discussed in the following section illustrate, such an analysis
jeopardizes the viability and potential of the NLRA defamation
defense.
C. Case Studies
In three recent defamation cases in the labor context, state trial
courts erroneously inquired whether the allegedly defamatory speech
at issue was “arguably protected or prohibited by” the NLRA’s unfair
labor practice provisions in order to determine whether they should
263. Id. at 360; see also Secunda, supra note 253, at 213 (summarizing succinctly the
continuum proposal, noting that “federal labor laws come in two varieties—those
where the entire field is occupied by federal law (‘conduct on a continuum’) and
those areas where the federal law just provides some restrictions (‘conduct not on a
continuum’)”).
264. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Budak, No. 2007-T-0033, 2008 WL 2332543, at *5 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 6, 2008) (applying the NLRA defamation defense after determining that
there was a labor dispute).
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265

apply the defamation defense.
These cases illustrate the potential
perils of applying the continuum proposal to the defamation context.
These three courts applied an equivalent of the continuum proposal.
As a result, in all three instances the courts did not apply the NLRA
defamation defense and its heightened standard of proof to the
defamation claims. All three cases resulted in unfavorable jury
outcomes, at least initially, for the defendants. Viewed together,
these examples demonstrate that proposals like the continuum
proposal could result in reduced application of the NLRA
defamation defense and increased unpredictability as to whether a
court will apply the defense. Both of these dynamics threaten to
further chill speech and accompanying collective activity in the NLRA
266
context.
Maki
267
In J. Maki Construction Co. v. Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters,
the trial court concluded that the NLRA defamation defense did not
apply because the NLRA’s unfair labor practice provisions would not
protect an employee from adverse employment actions flowing from
268
the allegedly defamatory statements. In Maki, a union engaging in
an area standards labor dispute with a construction company made
allegedly defamatory statements about the company on a handbill
269
that it distributed to the public. The handbill contained a limerick,
which referenced the dispute and stated that the company’s work
1.

265. Sutter Health v. UNITE HERE, No. 2:05-CV-1081, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20892, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005), remanded, No. SCV17938 (Cal. Sup. Ct.),
appeal filed, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2008); Hughes v. N. Cal. Carpenters
Reg’l Council, No. A112272, 2007 WL 1448746, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2007);
J. Maki Constr. Co. v. Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters (Maki II), 882 N.E.2d 1173,
1176–77 (Ill. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 889 N.E.2d 1116 (Ill. 2008).
266. For a case explicitly rejecting reasoning similar to the continuum proposal,
see Raffensberger v. Moran, 485 A.2d 447, 451 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). In that case,
the court rejected a proposal that the court consider whether the allegedly
defamatory statements at issue in that case fell on a protected-prohibited continuum.
Id. at 451. The court stated, “Clearly, Linn is not limited to situations involving the
provisions of sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. The application of Linn, rather, turns on
the scope of the judicial definition of a ‘labor dispute’ in the context of a libel case.”
For a similar critique regarding the “vagaries of judicial line-drawing” in a different
context, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990). Estlund argues
that a First Amendment analysis that requires courts to determine whether matters
are of public concern “looms as a significant threat to freedom of speech.” Id. at 3.
267. 882 N.E.2d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
268. Id. at 1181.
269. Id. at 1177.
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270

product was, among other things, “crappy.” The trial court refused
to apply the NLRA defamation defense, stating that there was no
“connection between the handbill and the existence of a labor
271
dispute.” In doing so, the trial court drew a parallel to the Supreme
Court’s Jefferson Standard case, which found no NLRA section 8(a)
protection for adverse employment actions flowing from disloyal
272
speech unconnected to an ongoing labor dispute.
The trial court determined that NLRA section 8(a) would not
protect adverse employment actions flowing from the allegedly
defamatory statement in a hypothetical NLRB case, which meant that
the NLRA defamation defense did not protect the statement in the
273
The Maki jury ordered the union defendants
defamation case.
to pay $2,353,000 in damages, “the highest [jury award] in Illinois
274
outside of [the Chicago area] to be reported . . . since 1985.”
The Appellate Court of Illinois, however, overturned the trial court’s
275
ruling.
Referring to the NLRA defamation defense, the appeals
court concluded that, similar to the statements in Austin, the use of
the word “crappy” was made in a “loose, figurative sense” and could
276
not be the basis for defamation liability.
Sutter Health
277
In Sutter Health v. UNITE HERE, the trial court employed similar
logic and determined that the NLRA defamation defense did not
278
apply. In Sutter Health, a union that was engaged in a labor dispute
with a laundry subcontractor made allegedly defamatory statements
about the subcontractor and its major clients, Sutter Health and
2.

270. See id. (noting that the bottom of the handbill stated that “[t]he Carpenters
Union is currently engaged in a labor dispute with Maki Construction over the
payment of substandard wages and benefits”).
271. Id. at 1182. The trial court reasoned that Linn did not apply to “statements
made during the course of a labor dispute that had no rational relationship to the
subject matter of the dispute.” J. Maki Constr. Co. v. Chi. Reg’l Council of
Carpenters (Maki I), No. 05 L 503, 2007 WL 1108443 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2007)
(citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)).
272. Maki I, 2007 WL 1108443 (citing Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464 (1953)).
273. Id.
274. John Flynn Rooney, Lake County Jury Hammers Union for Defaming Builder,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 22, 2006, at 1; Barbara Rose, Union Defamed Builder,
Jury Finds; Carpenters Ordered to Pay $2.35 Million, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 2006, at C1.
275. Maki II, 882 N.E.2d at 1183.
276. Id. at 1184.
277. No. 2:05-CV-1081, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20892, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10,
2005), remanded, No. SCV17938 (Cal. Sup. Ct.), appeal filed, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 15, 2008). UNITE HERE unsuccessfully tried to remove the case to federal
court, arguing that the federal court had jurisdiction over the secondary boycott
claims. See id. at *2.
278. Id. at *9.
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Sutter hospitals.
In a postcard, the union referenced its labor
dispute with the subcontractor and alleged that the linens in the
hospital’s birthing center may contain “blood, feces, and harmful
280
pathogens.” The bottom of the postcard stated in smaller typeface
that UNITE HERE was currently “engaged in a labor dispute with
Angelica Textile Services,” the primary linen subcontractor for
281
Sutter.
It appears that the Sutter Health trial court refused to apply the
NLRA defamation defense to the allegedly defamatory statements in
part because it determined that NLRA section 8(a) would not protect
282
the statements.
It also reasoned that, because NLRA section 8(b)
would prohibit the statements about a neutral party (the hospital),
the NLRA defamation defense could not be applied to those
283
statements in a defamation case.
The jury returned a $17 million
284
The union is currently appealing the
verdict favorable to Sutter.
award, which is “one of the highest ever awarded against a labor
285
union in the United States.”
UNITE HERE is requesting that a
California appellate court either reverse the verdict and enter
judgment for the union, or reverse and remand for a new trial based
on the heightened standard required by the NLRA’s partial
286
protection of defamatory speech doctrine.
As of the date this
287
Article went to print, the appeal is still pending.
279. Id. at *2. Sutter Health involved a union’s efforts to pressure Angelica Textile
Services to accept recognition of the union. Appellant UNITE HERE’s Opening
Brief at *1, Sutter Health v. UNITE HERE, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15,
2008), 2008 WL 2478283. According to the union-defendant, which represented
some of Angelica’s employees, its dispute with Angelica was over “the best way to
provide Angelica’s non-union employees a free choice in deciding whether they wish
to be represented by the union.” Angelica Corporation and UNITE HERE Resolve Labor
Dispute, BUS. WIRE, June 14, 2005, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_m0EIN/is_2005_June_14/ai_n13814369/.
280. Sutter Health, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20892, at *4.
281. Appellant UNITE HERE’s Opening Brief, supra note 279, at Exh. A.
282. The Sutter Health trial court agreed with Sutter that no NLRA labor dispute
existed under the circumstances and declined to charge the jury to apply the
heightened standard of proof. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20892, at *1–2, *5–8, *15–19.
Sutter had argued that there was no NLRA labor dispute because the union
statements, (1) discussed something other than working conditions or a labor
dispute, and (2) were made about an employer (Sutter) with whom the union did
not have a primary labor dispute. Id. at *15–19.
283. Id. at *1–2, *5–8, *15–19.
284. See Union Must Pay Millions in Defamation Case, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2006, at B4
(reporting the $17.3 million jury award in Sutter).
285. Mehul Srivastava, Jury Award Stings Union: UNITE Here Hit With $17.2 Million
Decision in Sutter Defamation Suit, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 22, 2006, at A1 (stating that if
the jury award is affirmed, it could “cripple” the union’s finances).
286. Among other things, the union is arguing that there was a labor dispute such
that the heightened standard should have applied regardless of whether the
statements were made about a non-primary employer and regardless of whether the
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Hughes
288
In Hughes v. Northern California Carpenters Regional Council, the
state trial and appellate courts determined that the NLRA defamation
defense should not be applied to allegedly defamatory statements
289
made during a labor dispute. Hughes involved a union engaged in
290
an area standards labor dispute with a drywall subcontractor.
During the labor dispute, the union distributed a handbill that
291
referenced the labor dispute generally and made a statement that
the subcontractor had committed a crime (by allegedly exposing
292
himself to the picketers) and was a danger to children. Instead of
applying the NLRA defamation defense and the defense’s
heightened standard of proof, the appellate court determined that
the defense did not apply because the statements would not be
293
protected by NLRA section 8(a). The court said:
3.

The flyer was a personal attack on Hughes himself, seeking to
portray him as someone who engaged in sex crimes and posed a
sexual danger to children. It was not relevant to the Union’s area
standards picketing or any labor dispute, nor was it regarding an
statements had content discussing something other than working conditions and the
primary labor dispute. Appellant UNITE HERE’s Opening Brief, supra note 279,
at 10.
287. Various documents have been filed in relation to the appeal. Respondent’s
Brief in Answer to Amici Curiae Brief, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2009),
2009 WL 1346661; Appellant UNITE HERE’s Reply Brief, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 22, 2009), 2009 WL 480320; Respondent’s Brief, No. C054400 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 15, 2008), 2008 WL 2478283.
288. No. A112272, 2007 WL 1448746 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2007).
289. Id. at *3, *6.
290. Id. at *1. The union believed Hughes was paying wages that were “less than
an ‘area standard’ figure published by the State of California.” Id. As the court
described, “[T]he Union was not attempting to organize the workers at Hughes
Drywall, but was instead engaged in ‘area standards’ picketing.” Id. at *5.
291. One side of the flyer mentioned the “ongoing dispute” and the union’s
picketing at Hughes. Id. at *5 n.6.
292. Id. at *2–3. The events preceding the defamation suit were heated. On one
occasion, while the union was picketing outside of Hughes Drywall, Hughes “held a
union jacket in front of his groin and pretended to urinate on it.” Id. at *2. There
was a factual dispute as to whether Hughes “actually expose[d] himself during the
incident.” Id. As the court explained,
Two of [Hughes’s employees and his son] also testified that Hughes did not
expose himself during the incident. The picketers had a different view.
[A union member] testified that he was on the picket line that day,
and saw Hughes remove his penis from his pants and rub it on the Union
jacket. . . . [A]nother picketer, saw Hughes partially unzip his pants and rub
the Union jacket on his crotch.
Id. Not long after a union representative reported the incident to the police,
“Hughes again attempted to express his views of the Union by lowering his pants and
‘mooning’ the picketers,” stating “kiss my ass.” Id. The union used a copy of the
police report regarding the incident to prepare a flyer that it distributed to the
public and to businesses in the area. Id.
293. Id. at *6.
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issue conceivably subject to the protections of [section] 7 or the
294
prohibitions of [section] 8 of the [NLRA].

While the outcome of the jury trial was affirmed on appeal by the
state’s highest court, the $1.5 million award was reduced to
295
approximately $650,000.
These three case studies demonstrate the hazards of revising NLRA
preemption theory in such a way that it would increase state law
adjudication of whether NLRA sections 8(a) and 8(b) protect or
prohibit certain allegedly defamatory statements. Such adjudication
is more complex than the inquiry called for by current doctrine.
Widely accepted current doctrine merely asks state courts to
adjudicate whether the allegedly defamatory statements were made
during labor disputes. Of course, it is unknown whether the trial
outcomes in these cases would have been different if the trial courts
had applied the NLRA defamation defense. Nonetheless, the failure
to apply the NLRA defamation defense meant that the jury evaluated
the defamation claims based on the less exacting, and therefore more
plaintiff-friendly, state law standards of proof. Thus, these cases
illustrate that a simple application of the continuum proposal would
likely reduce the frequency with which the NLRA defamation defense
is applied. It may therefore unintentionally deteriorate the NLRA
defamation defense and stunt its potential to protect new forms of
collective activity.
A less often cited aspect of the continuum proposal acknowledges
that states should be “free to regulate labor relations, in parallel with
the NLRA and beyond, except where state law conflicts with an
296
interest protected by the NLRA.”
Defamation law is one of the
areas that potentially conflicts with an essential interest protected by
the NLRA: that of free speech during a labor dispute. To avoid
conflict with the NLRA’s free speech policies, the NLRA’s
preemption doctrine should not be narrowed in such a way that
would direct courts to engage in “arguably protected or prohibited
by” inquiries on a case-by-case basis. Such a doctrine threatens to
297
chill speech and interfere with the NLRA’s underlying purpose of

294. Id.
295. California Court Affirms Defamation Finding Against Carpenters, Cuts Punitive
Damages, BNA DAILY LABOR REP., May 25, 2007, at A3.
296. Gottesman, supra note 9, at 426 (emphasis added).
297. By focusing on the NLRA’s preemption doctrine in a particular context—the
defamation context—I contribute to the agenda of developing a “nuanced analysis”
that considers where federal-level regulation is best and where “state and local
heterogeneity would be most beneficial.” See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 8, at 1172
(“[G]reater state and local labor regulation may expand welfare-enhancing worker
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protecting collective activity by protecting less egregious defamatory
298
Instead, future
speech from the reach of state defamation law.
proposals should take care to retain the NLRA defamation defense
and its mandate that courts consider only whether an allegedly
defamatory statement was made during a labor dispute.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with Congressional intent, the NLRA defamation
defense has promoted speech and collective activity among
employees for their mutual aid and protection. In this way, the
NLRA’s freedom of speech policies allow some “freedom to defame,”
albeit only with respect to less egregious forms of defamation.
Speech is undoubtedly an important outlet that allows workers and
their organizations to innovate in the face of new challenges.
Moreover, while many aspects of the NLRA are beleaguered and out
299
of step with modern workplace relations, the defamation defense
provides the NLRA with some potential to remain relevant in the
context of new challenges, new worker organizations, and new
300
worker organizing strategies. It is still too early to put the final nail
in the NLRA’s coffin.

voice and participation in certain geographic areas, but is not a particularly
promising avenue for the country as a whole.”).
298. In this way, this Article joins existing literature that is similarly skeptical about
the prospects of state involvement in labor relations. See generally Jeffrey Hirsch,
Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L.J. 225 (2008).
299. See Gould, supra note 221, at 668 (“The Act has done a less than stellar job in
promoting the statutory objectives . . . .”).
300. See Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 225 (2005) (referring to the NLRA as having “potential for
reinvigorating the labor movement and saving the soul of this country . . . [and]
embody[ing] values that were intended to, and still can, transform our workplaces
and our society”). See generally Kati L. Griffith, Globalizing U.S. Employment Statutes
Through Foreign Law Influence: Mexico’s Foreign Employer Provision and Recruited Mexican
Workers, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 424 (2008) (demonstrating that foreign law can
influence federal employment law in some circumstances and noting that the U.S.
labor and employment law regime has some potential “to remain relevant and cope
with challenges linked to increasing global economic integration.”).

